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1. Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility of predicting what firms ultimately 
become targets in a merger and acquisition transaction, by replicating the results of Garvey, 
Milbourn & Xie in “What Will It Do For My EPS” (2013). 
There are significant amounts of literature providing evidence that bidders are higher valued 
than their targets and that both parties in a takeover transaction tend to be in temporarily high-
valued industries. Differences in valuation also indicate who will be an acquirer and when. The 
likelihood of being a target is higher when other firms in the industry can acquire the target using 
stock as consideration and if it has an accretive effect for the bidder, even when a significant 
premium is paid.  
We find that the number of viable accretive bidders, controlling for other measures in the 
existing literature, is identifiably a strong target predictor. The results when trying to predict likely 
bidders are however not as clear. A firm is likely to be a bidder when there are more viable accretive 
targets in the industry, but unlike target prediction these results are somewhat obscured by existing 
measures, especially those related to misvaluation. Our results on target and bidder prediction are 
in line with what the original paper finds. Like Garvey, Milbourn & Xie (2013), we identify that 
the likelihood of a merger being stock financed increases with the targets number of viable accretive 
bidders. 
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2. Preface 
This paper is written as the concluding part of our Master of Science in Economics and 
Business Administration, majoring in finance, at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH).     
After attending, both finance and strategy courses highlighting the different aspects, and the 
importance of mergers and acquisitions, we wanted to use our thesis as a possibility to investigate 
this field further. In particular, the fact that there are many different views on the determinants 
driving merger activity suggests that further research is desirable to fully comprehend the 
underlying mechanisms. During our work, we found that in addition to the ability to interpret 
historical data and empirical results, gathering reliable data and constructing a correct dataset is of 
great importance for the conclusions reached. This suggests that when reading and using existing 
work, one should pay attention not only to the findings, but also to the way they were obtained. We 
hope this paper can provide valid contribution to further work on merger activity. We are 
responsible for all errors.        
We would like to extend a special thanks to our advisor, Francisco Santos (NHH), for helping 
us find an interesting topic and being both available and supportive at all times during the writing 
process. Further, his detailed and professional guidance has provided us with valuable insight and 
led us in the right direction for completing our thesis.  
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3. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possibility of predicting what firms ultimately 
become targets in a merger and acquisition transaction. By replicating the results in Garvey, 
Milbourn & Xie’s paper “What will it do for my EPS” (2013), we attempt to identify if the 
likelihood of ultimately becoming a target is related to the number of viable bidders. In line with 
their additional hypothesis, we also investigate if the number of viable bidders and targets carry 
predictive power regarding whether stock is used as the source of finance. Throughout this paper, 
we attempt to follow the exact approach as described in Garvey et al (2013) in order to achieve 
comparable results and highlight the validity of their findings. 
Being able to predict mergers and acquisitions can benefit managers by assisting in the 
process of forming their firm’s strategy. Further, it may supply relevant value-adding information 
to portfolio investors’ stock picking decisions. This is of great importance as there is a significant 
amount of empirical evidence suggesting that the target’s shareholders receive sizeable positive 
market returns following a takeover announcement1 (Bruner, 2001). 
Even though a range of studies have been undertaken in order to understand the dynamics 
of mergers and acquisitions, we still know relatively little about their determinants. Mergers and 
acquisitions are motivated by either managerial or value enhancing motives (Motis, 2007). Value 
enhancement can be achieved either by synergies, i.e. the value of the combined entity is greater 
than that of the two firms separately, or due to misvaluation of the target- or acquirer firm. This 
paper focuses on misvaluation and to what extent a firm that perceive themselves as overvalued by 
the market can utilize this mispricing to acquire relatively undervalued targets.     
Recent literature argues that acquisitions are driven by stock market valuations more than 
synergies and managerial objectives as indicated in earlier literature (Schleifer & Vishny, 2003; 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Jensen 2005). Schleifer & Vishny (2003) suggest that 
acquirers tend to purchase underpriced assets with relatively overvalued stock and Dong et al. 
(2006) claim bidders tend to be more highly valued than their targets. Dong et al. (2006) and 
                                                 
1 Markets react much more to targets as they are harder to predict, hence the announcements are more surprising (Prabhala, 1997) 
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Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) furthermore claim that both parties tend to be in temporarily high valued 
industries. An economic shock that unevenly affects firm valuations in an industry could therefore 
motivate acquisitions of relatively cheaper firms by more highly valued firms.  
Following the approach in Garvey et al (2013), we adopt the theories related to market 
misvaluation and target prediction in an attempt to, ex ante, identify what firms ultimately become 
acquirers and targets. They first define two viability measures based on earnings- and book values 
per share. Combining Schleifer & Vishny’s (2003) model, with the basic “EPS bootstrap game” 
described by Brealey et al (2007) produces a model that qualifies any two firms in the same two 
digit SIC industry as viable candidates to merge simply if the party with the higher multiple can 
increase its earnings per share (EPS) or book value per share (BVPS) after paying the target a 
premium on the deal. This assumes that the market will apply the acquirer's multiple to the entire 
post-merger entity, increasing its EPS (or BVPS) when acquiring a target with a lower price-to-
earnings (price-to-book) multiple. This simple approach developed in Garvey et al (2013) is the 
basis for our counts of viable bidders and targets for each firm.  
Deviating from Garvey et al (2013), we exclude the approach based on the residual income 
model (RIM), thus we only consider a pair to be viable, under the previously mentioned conditions, 
if the acquirer can increase its earnings- or book value per share.  
In an attempt to add value to the findings, we expand upon some of Garvey et al’s (2013) 
work. First, we add a third industry to investigate the relationship between the number of firms 
taken over and the number of firms in the industry. Further, as the main goal of our paper is to 
verify and investigate Garvey et al’s (2013) results, we additionally run a more comprehensive 
sensitivity analysis related to the acquisition premium. We also place greater emphasis on 
describing the construction of the dataset to accommodate future replications. 
In our empirical analysis, we apply an exhaustive set of controls following Garvey et al 
(2013) to affirm the robustness of our results and isolate the papers intended contribution. This 
includes a range of size and misvaluation measures. In line with the original paper, we use the 
misvaluation measures from Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) as our main control variables. Our main 
variables of interest are thus the two viability measures and Rhodes-Kropf et al’s (2005) three 
misvaluation components.  
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We are successful in finding clear evidence that the likelihood of being a target is in fact 
increasing with the number of viable accretive bidders in the industry. The results are evident using 
both earnings- and book values per share. This provides a strong indication that market mispricing 
is an important driver for merger likelihood, which is in line with the findings in the original work 
by Garvey et al (2013). 
Moreover, our results suggest that there are additional relevant variables that should be taken 
into consideration when predicting the likelihood of being a target. First, we observe that the 
number of takeovers in a firm's industry has a strong predictive power. This is in line with Garvey 
et al (2013), pointing out that the wave variable indeed can help identify industries where high 
takeover activity and merger rates are observed. However, it does not distinguish between targets 
and bidders. Consistently across all of our results, the number of takeovers in the industry is an 
important variable being highly significant for identifying targets, acquirers and merger intensity 
at the firm level. Next, misvaluation resulting from a firm-specific error defined in Rhodes-Kropf 
et al (2005) proves to have a positive relationship to target likelihood. This suggests that firms, 
which are overvalued due to self-specific attributes, not connected to the market as a whole, have 
a greater chance of being taken over2. Lastly, we find a negative relationship with the firm's price-
to-forecasted earnings ratio implying targets tend to have relatively cheaper earnings.  
With our distinctive target results in hand, we shift our focus towards predicting acquirers. 
Although we find clear evidence that the number of viable targets available is related to the 
likelihood of being an acquirer, the results are not as robust to the inclusion of controls as for the 
target prediction. Predicting acquirers seems to be more related to various components of 
misvaluation rather than the sheer number of viable targets available. Figure 1, illustrating a 
summary of empirical distribution of measures for realized takeovers, highlights these unclear 
results. Even though acquirers have a significantly larger number of viable targets than the other 
two samples, they are also consistently distinguishable across almost all of the measures.   
Turning our attention to the second hypothesis, namely that the number of viable bidders 
and targets are positively related to the likelihood of stock being used as the method of payment, 
                                                 
2 Further analysis of the acquirers show that they tend to have an even higher self-specific overvaluation. 
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we are only able to find partially supporting evidence. Our findings suggest that only the target's 
number of accretive bidders is significant, thus proving to be the leading predictor in identifying, 
at the firm level, whether or not a deal will be financed with stock. Further, the acquirer’s number 
of accretive targets shows a positive relationship giving additional support for the hypothesis.  
Additionally, we find that both the target- and acquirer’s firm-specific misvaluation component has 
a strong positive significance, meaning that firm-specific overvaluation increase the likelihood of 
a deal being stock financed.  
When predicting the medium of exchange at the industry level we observe the most 
conflicting results with what was found in the original paper. The industry average number of 
accretive bidders is mostly positive and significant, but shifts to negative when we manually control 
for industry fixed effects. This is conflicting in the sense that Garvey et al (2013) find it to be 
positive and significant across all regressions (even if the coefficients drop dramatically when 
controlling for industry fixed effects) and it is one of their main contributors to support the second 
hypothesis.     
The dataset construction process requires gathering and combining data from a number of 
different sources. As there is no single correct way to combine these multiple datasets, due to 
limitations in unique identifiers and discrepancies in the data, this could be a potential source of 
differences between Garvey et al’s (2013) results and ours.  Due to the originally substantial sample 
size and lack of information in Garvey et al’s (2013) paper regarding the sample construction, our 
focus has been on quality and not quantity of our observations, resulting in a somewhat lower 
sample size, but arguably more correct data points.  
The proceeding sections of this paper are structured as follows: Chapter 4 provides a review 
of literature describing relevant topics for this paper. Chapter 5 presents the model development 
and the resulting hypotheses and chapter 6 provides a detailed description of how we constructed 
our dataset. Chapter 7 specifies the empirical models and key variables before we proceed to 
present our main empirical results in chapter 8. Lastly, chapter 9 sums up our paper and concludes.   
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4. Literature Review 
As pointed out in the introduction there is a large amount of previous studies on the different 
aspects related to mergers and acquisitions. In this section, we will provide a brief review of 
literature relevant to this paper3.  
Closest to the work of Garvey et al (2013) is the model developed by Schleifer & Vishny 
(2003). Under the assumption of inefficient markets and fully rational managers, these models 
advocate that transactions are driven by stock market misvaluations of the merging firms. The idea 
that stock market misvaluations shape merger activity dates back to Nelson’s publication of 1959, 
which indicates that mergers are not only related to prosperity but also the state of capital markets 
(Nelson, 1959). The key concept provided by Schleifer & Vishny (2003) is that acquirers take 
advantage of their overvalued stock and use it as consideration for acquiring relatively less 
overvalued targets. The target firm benefits in the short run from the premium, whilst the bidder is 
able to acquire a larger part of the combined firm due to the relative misvaluation. 
 Fuller & Jensen (2002) state that managers may engage in the earnings guidance game 
striving to meet analyst forecasts and often unrealistic expectations. Furthermore, Jensen (2005) 
finds that overvalued equity may lead to unfruitful acquisitions, reducing the fundamental long-run 
value of the firm. Hence, high stock prices and firm strategies driven by analyst forecasts could be 
damaging for the firm. This is consistent with our, and the original papers assumption that managers 
may carelessly believe the market will apply the acquirers higher multiple to the combined entity. 
 Identifying that stock prices deviate from their fundamental values on both sides of the 
transaction, Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) develop a model based on market misvaluation. 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) decompose the misvaluation effect into two main 
components, a market- or sector wide component and a firm-specific component. The market-wide 
component is common for both bidders and targets within the same sector while the firm-specific 
component is individual for each firm. The main issue for targets in a potential takeover is that they 
                                                 
3 This literature review follows closely the one in the original paper by Garvey et al (2013), adding on some additional insights we 
find relevant. 
10 
are unable to determine how much of their own misvaluation is a result of the firm-specific 
component, and how much is caused by the market-wide component. When there is a high market-
wide overvaluation, the more prone a target’s manager is to underestimate the shared market-wide 
misvaluation component of the two entities. As a result, they underestimate the synergy effects of 
the merger. The target is not irrational, but due to this limited information, they may face problems 
correctly quantifying the sources of the total overvaluation and accept the deal.  
 Dong et al (2006) investigate both Q-theories and misvaluation of mergers. Q-theory bases 
itself on how bidders redeploy target assets. Brainard & Tobin (1968) apply price-to-book as a 
proxy for expected growth or managerial efficiency to investigate the Q-hypothesis. Previous 
literature indicates that a firm with a higher price-to-book ratio generates a higher return on their 
assets. Bidder and target valuations are here tied to the stock price-to-book ratios at the date of 
announcement. Takeovers of bad targets, i.e. targets with low price-to-book, by good bidders, i.e. 
bidders with high price-to-book, tend to improve efficiencies more than takeovers of good targets 
by bad bidders. The key difference between Dong et al (2006) and the original paper is that Garvey 
et al’s (2013) tests include nearly all firms with public information and focus on predicting ex ante 
what firms become targets or acquirers, whilst Dong et al (2006) focus on deals that actually took 
place. Further, price-to-book and price-to-value (presented as RIM bidders and targets in Garvey 
et al (2013)) supply complementary information. Therefore, we limit our analysis of Q-theory 
based on price-to-book and price-to-forecasted earnings, as this seems sufficient for the intended 
contribution of this paper. 
 In an effort to test the models of Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) and Schleifer & 
Vishny (2003) empirically, Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) use a more comprehensive valuation 
method. In order to better assess the sources of misvaluation they decompose the mispricing into 
three components using a model including book values, net income and leverage. They argue that 
misvaluation can be broken down into a firm-specific error, a sector mispricing error and a long-
run mispricing error. Their results show that targets and acquirers have higher market-to-book 
values relative to firms not involved in merger activity. Furthermore, they find that high price to 
book firms tend to be acquired by even higher price to book firms. Additionally, the firm-specific 
error is greater for bidders than targets in both the total sample of takeovers and the subsample of 
takeovers using only stock as the medium of exchange.  
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Surprisingly however, they find that low long-run value-to-book firms tend to acquire high 
long-run value-to-book targets. This is somewhat conflicting with Q-theory, which argues that 
firms with high growth opportunities (i.e. firms with high long-run value-to-book) should buy firms 
with lower growth opportunities. Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) argue that these contradicting results 
can be attributed to some form of market inefficiency and information asymmetries.  
 Several recent studies investigate the importance of merger waves as a reinforcement of 
overall merger activity and the underlying reasons for their occurrence. Gorton et al (2009) show 
that if managers value personal benefits of control sufficiently, they may engage in unprofitable 
defensive acquisitions. A technological or regulatory change that makes acquisitions profitable in 
some future states of the market can induce a pre-emptive wave of unprofitable, defensive 
acquisitions. Hardford (2005) also documents the idea that industry related shocks could cause 
merger waves. Further, Thakor & Goel (2010) show that envy can contribute to a positive cross-
sectional correlation in mergers because a firm is more likely to acquire when another firm in its 
environment has acquired. Hence, acquisitions that would not have found place in the absence of 
previous acquisitions are now undertaken. 
 As stated in the introduction, this paper replicates the work and results presented in the 
paper “What Will It Do For My EPS?” by Garvey et al (2013). In their research, they investigate 
the possibilities of matching up and predicting potential targets and bidders. Their main results 
show that the number of viable bidders for firms that are actually taken over in the following year 
is far higher than for the firms that either are acquirers or not involved in any merger activity. 
Further, in support of their predictions, they expect to find that subsequent bidders have a far greater 
number of viable targets than either of the other two categories, target firms or firms not taking part 
in merger activity. After running probit regressions on target likelihood, their results show that the 
number of viable bidders is a far stronger target predictor than any other measure found in previous 
literature. These results are consistent with ours. Additionally, they find that the likelihood of being 
a bidder increases with the number of available targets. However, these results are not as impressive 
as for target prediction as they are obscured by several existing size and valuation measures. We 
reach the same conclusion, and find that specifically four factors: firm-specific error and long-run 
value-to-book from Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005), industry number of takeovers and leverage seem to 
be strong predictors of bidder likelihood.  
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Garvey et al (2013) also test if the number of viable bidders and targets are relevant 
predictors for the medium of exchange. Specifically they investigate whether the number of targets 
and bidders increase the likelihood of the deal being financed with stock both on the firm and 
industry level. In line with the original paper, we also find that the targets number of viable bidders 
is a strong predictor. However, Garvey et al (2013) also find that the acquirer’s number of viable 
targets has strong predictive power. We find a positive, although not significant, relationship in our 
regressions. This paper follows the exact same approach as described in “What Will It Do For My 
EPS?” except we exclude the measures and analyses related to RIM.  
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5. Model and Resulting Hypothesis 
In this section, we start by introducing Q-theory, which the formulas for counting viable 
bidders and targets are based upon. We then proceed to specify the assumptions before presenting 
the hypotheses. The description of Q-theory and the resulting formulas are to a great extent similar 
to the corresponding section found in the original paper. We feel however, that it is valuable to 
include, as it makes the following sections more intuitive and helps the reader form a better 
understanding of the central measures in the analyses. We follow the same structure as Garvey et 
al (2013) and present the same formulas, but also try to explain in more detail how they are, in 
practice, applied to our calculations.    
The original paper by Garvey et al (2013) derives two empirically testable predictions and 
define a simple model of mergers based on Schleifer & Vishny (2003). Schleifer & Vishny (2003) 
denote a potential merger pair with 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1) has 𝐾0 (𝐾1) units of capital 
with a stock price multiple of 𝑄0 (𝑄1). We assume, without loss of generality, that the stock multiple 
of the prospective acquirer 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 is higher than that of the prospective target 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0. Hence,  
  
 
         𝑄1 > 𝑄0                (1) 
 
The synergy (s) the market attaches to the combined post-merger entity is the key parameter in 
Schleifer & Vishny (2003) and the estimated market value of the combined entity is: 
 
  [𝐾1 + 𝐾0] × [𝑠𝑄1 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑄0]               (2) 
 
This is referred to as the short-term market value; hence, the synergy may contain pricing errors. 
In the baseline case without synergies, assuming an efficient market, s =
𝐾1
(𝐾1+𝐾0)
. The target firm 
is able to cash out immediately following the deal. Therefore, they are not concerned with the long-
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term value. Hence, the only relevant variable for the viability of an acquisition is the bidding firm’s 
view of s. 
The second part of Schleifer & Vishny’s (2003) model focuses on the long-term return to 
both the acquirer and target firm. As our analysis attempts to predict ex ante which firms will take 
part in a takeover, as either an acquirer or a target, the key component is that a bidder must pay a 
consideration including a non-zero premium given by a percentage of the target’s market value.  
Assuming without loss of generality that both firms have a single share outstanding and the 
acquirer issues additional shares (m) as consideration to the target, we have two conditions which 
must be satisfied for a firm pair to be viable for a merger. 
First, the bidder must issue enough shares to cover the required premium of ∏. 
 
           
𝑚
1+𝑚
(𝑠𝑄1 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑄0)(𝐾1 + 𝐾0) = 𝑄0𝐾0(1 + ∏)             (3) 
 
Second, the acquiring firm does not lose market value following the merger. 
 
     
1
1+𝑚
(𝑠𝑄1 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑄0)(𝐾1 + 𝐾0) ≥ 𝑄1𝐾1             (4) 
 
These conditions are satisfied when: 
 
𝑄1+𝑄0
𝑄0
>
∏𝐾0
𝑠(𝐾1+𝐾0)−𝐾1
                (5) 
 
The main issue when applying these conditions to the data is that the bidder’s beliefs 
regarding the synergy effects are not observable. The extreme case put forward in the original 
paper, under the assumption of an efficient market where management do not believe in synergies, 
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𝑠 =
𝐾1
(𝐾1+𝐾0)
, the two conditions can never be satisfied for any ∏ > 0. This is quite intuitive, as the 
bidder will not offer a premium if there are no perceived synergies to gain from the merger.  
The opposite extreme case, where 𝑠 = 1 and the bidder believes the market will apply the 
bidder’s pre-merger multiple to the combined post-merger entity. By rearranging equation (5) and 
substituting for 𝑠 = 1, all that is necessary, is for the bidders multiple to exceed the targets multiple 
by the premium. In this case, the first (3) and second (4) conditions are satisfied as long as: 
 
𝑄1 > (1 + ∏) × 𝑄0                (6) 
 
As mentioned in the original paper by Garvey et al (2013), this is a straightforward and 
relatively extreme bootstrapping result. Due to the extremity of this assumption, applying it to our 
real-life data requires considering three main issues.  
 When applied to the model, many firms will have multiple viable bidders for most 
reasonable premiums, resulting from the wide spread between valuation multiples in broadly 
defined industries. This implies that the likelihood of an actual takeover taking place is at least an 
order of magnitude greater than what is observed in the actual data. Following the original paper´s 
simple accommodation (Garvey et al, 2013), a fraction X of the population does not believe in the 
bootstrap game. As only one viable bidder is necessary for a firm to be taken over we denote the 
number of firms that satisfy the first (3) and second (4) condition by n. A potential target is thus 
taken over with the probability 1 − 𝑋𝑛. The fraction of the population X is unknown, however this 
observation suggests we should apply a concave transformation to the number of viable bidders in 
the empirical tests. 
 Secondly, when 𝑠 = 1, relative size does not matter. Under this assumption, the market will 
apply a small bidders multiple to the combined entity, even though the target is relatively larger. 
This might seem counterintuitive; however, Harford (1999) finds that targets are not on average 
small firms. We confirm this basic result in our data, where we cannot differentiate between the 
size of a target and a non-merger observation.  
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Additionally, in unreported robustness tests, implementing the requirement that the bidder´s 
assets are greater than those of the target, provide the same results. Garvey et al (2010) find that 
only 2% of actual merger deals involve a target buying a firm more than four times its asset size. 
We test for the restriction that prohibits a firm from buying a target whose total asset value is greater 
than four times its own, and our results hold up.  
 Lastly, in line with the original paper, we have adopted the modeling assumption put 
forward by Schleifer & Vishny (2003), that mispricing rather than valuation of differential cash 
flow and risk expectations causes deviations in multiples. Subsequent empirical literature provided 
by Dong et al (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) attempt to identify valuation models to isolate 
mispricing. This paper bases itself more on bidder behavior and beliefs. From the target's point of 
view, the deal is acceptable simply if it is offered the required premium. The deal is viable for the 
bidder as long as the deal increases it’s per share value, either measured by forecasted earnings per 
share or book value per share. Furthermore, we argue that the likelihood of a merger taking place 
is a function of the number of viable bidders or targets available. Hence, the possibility for a firm 
to find a bidder, for it to sell itself to, who can provide the desired premium, increases with the 
number of viable bidders.  
Following the original paper, the two hypotheses tested are: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (𝑯𝟏) 
The likelihood of a firm being a target is positively related to the number of viable bidders. 
 
As we argue that merger activity is driven by relative misvaluation, which is captured by 
our estimates of viable bidders and targets on stock financed deals, following the original paper, 
we adopt the additional prediction: 
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Hypothesis 2 (𝑯𝟐) 
The likelihood of the use of stock as method of payment is positively related to the number of viable 
bidders and viable targets. 
 
Based on the findings in Garvey et al (2013), we have high confidence in H1 linking the 
number of viable bidders to the probability of being a target. Initially Garvey et al (2013) were less 
confident in 𝐻2 than 𝐻1, as Boone & Mulherin (2007) find it likely that the presence of a viable 
stock-financed bidder may put a firm in play, but the successful bidder may end up using a 
significant amount of cash, particularly if there are many potential bidders. Garvey et al (2013) 
found supporting evidence of H2, making it interesting to see if our results are mostly in line with 
theirs or Boone and Mulherin. 
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6. Data Construction 
The following section provides a detailed description of how our dataset was constructed. 
We base our initial sample on all the firms in the Compustat universe, extracting historical merger 
observations from the SDC Platinum financial transaction database. Please see Appendix 11.1 – 
11.3 for definitions and item-codes from our databases. 
The first step is extracting all domestic deals in the time-period 1981 to 2012 from the SDC 
database to match the original paper’s sample-period. The search criteria include all deals taking 
the form of Mergers, Acquisitions, Acquisition of Majority Interest and Acquisition of Assets as 
well as transaction types Disclosed Value, Undisclosed Value, Leveraged Buyouts and Tender 
Offers. These filters provide us with a raw sample of 214,296 deal observations. For further filtering 
purposes, when extracting the report, we include the variables Announcement Date, Deal Status, 
Firm’s Public Status, CUSIP, Consideration Type and a Tender Offer Indicator. 
At this point, the dataset contains unwanted takeover observations resulting from merger 
activity between a firm and its parent. These intra-group acquisitions could be driven by other than 
value enhancing motives and are therefore removed. We therefore drop all duplicate records when 
the target’s CUSIP, acquirer’s CUSIP, Announcement Date and Deal Status are identical (dropping 
149 observations). Further, we drop the record if either of the acquirer’s CUSIP or acquirers’ 
parent’s CUSIP equals to of the target’s CUSIP or the target’s parent’s CUSIP, accounting for both 
immediate and ultimate parent CUSIPs (dropping 5,840 observations).  
The SDC data furthermore contains duplicate observations where an acquirer and target 
pair was recorded more than once in a year. Duplicate observations of the same exact deal will 
overweight the deals significance in the analysis; therefore, these duplicates in the same or the prior 
year are removed (dropping respectively 368 and 338 observations).  
The analysis process involve multiple control variables based on balance sheet and other 
financial data, hence we require both acquirer and target to have a public status. This leaves us with 
10,423 deal records (dropping 197,178 observations) prior to separating the sample into a target- 
and an acquirer sample. 
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To accurately follow the approach of Garvey et al (2013), we use CUSIPs as our company 
identifier4. A critical part of the dataset construction process is therefore to comprehend the nature 
of the CUSIP identifiers (e.g. how they are structured and how they might change over time), in 
order to successfully attach the correct financial data to each transaction observation. The SDC 
database provides six-digit historical CUSIPs (name CUSIPs) uniquely identifying the issuer of a 
security, but are subject to change over time. Compustat, our source of financial data, provides 
eight-digit header CUSIPs where the two last digits uniquely identify the issue number. Header 
CUSIPs are the last held CUSIP of a company, and can thus relate to several historical CUSIPs 
held by that particular company in the past.  
Working with the target sample, we require all targets to have an eight-digit CUSIP. To 
achieve this we link the six-digit CUSIPs from SDC to the first six digits of the eight-digit historical 
CUSIPs in the file “Stocknames” from WRDS. For all matches we attach eight-digit historical- and 
header CUSIPs leaving us with 12,170 observations. This step however, creates artificial duplicate 
observations resulting from some of the six-digit CUSIPs from SDC matching with several 
historical CUSIPs in “Stocknames”. To identify and keep the correct eight-digit CUSIP observation 
we drop the artificially created observations where the Announcement Date is not between the start- 
and end of namedate (dropping 3,843 observations). This step removes most of the artificial 
duplicates created in the previous step, however, some still remain due to overlapping namedate 
intervals. We keep the original unique observations, which do not have an announcement date 
between start- and end of namedate, but still match on CUSIP. 
The SDC dataset contains unwanted duplicate data for our analysis, as a target may have 
multiple records with different acquirers within a year. A target, by definition, may only be taken 
over once5, and these multiple observations can be attributed to announced, but not completed 
deals. Multiple observations of the same target within the same year will result in overweighting 
this target’s data, hence we only allow a company to be recorded as a target once each year, and 
                                                 
4 Several other identifiers are available, such as PERMNO/PERMCO, GVKEY and TICKER. We will not discuss the accuracy and 
viability of the different measures as our goal is to replicate Garvey et al (2013). In future research, one could extend the approach 
by using different/additional company identifiers.  
5 As we only consider mergers resulting in a majority interest which results in the parent company consolidating the target company 
into their financial statements. 
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drop the record if it was recorded the prior year (dropping respectively 386 and 175 observations). 
After applying these filters, we have a target sample of 7,766 records and each target has only one 
record per year and the preceding years. 
We merge the SDC target sample with the CRSP Compustat Merged dataset (CCM), on 
eight-digit header CUSIP, to link financial data to the records. We obtain the calendar year from 
CCM by using the date at the end of the fiscal year, up to which the company reports its annual 
statement. Using the calendar year from CCM we find 9,664 matches with our SDC data either in 
the announcement year (actual records) or in the year before (fictional). We keep the fictional 
records where data is not available in the year of announcement (dropping 3,128 observations). 
The reason for creating these fictional records with financial data from the year prior to 
announcement is that many of the target firms do not provide annual reports in the year of which 
they were acquired. 
As a final cleanup step, we drop the remaining artificial duplicates created during the 
process, as well as a few observations where it is indistinguishable which data from CCM is correct 
for the record. This reduces the sample slightly, but ensures correct data for the remaining sample 
(dropping 51 observations). Leaving us with 6,485 target firm year observations compiled of 3,150 
observations with financial data the year of the announcement date, and 3,335 observations using 
financial data from the year prior to the announced year. 
Turning our attention to the acquirer sample, we follow the exact process as for the targets, 
except we allow a company to be an acquirer more than once in a single year and in the preceding 
years. This results in an acquirer sample of 7,297 firm years observations with financial data the 
year of the announcement date, and 121 observations using financial data from the year prior to the 
announced year. The sample is slightly larger than that of the targets as more financial information 
is more readily available for the acquirers. 
To construct the sample of firms not involved in merger activity we append the sample 
containing all firms in the Compustat universe removing all firm year observations that are included 
in either the target or acquirer sample. Following the same procedure as for the target and acquirer 
sample, we obtain eight-digit CUSIPs from “Stocknames” resulting in a sample of 184,405 non-
merger firm year observations.  
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Finally, to complete the total sample, we drop all duplicate records where a firm was 
recorded as an acquirer more than once in a year. This is to make sure the same company is not 
counted as a viable bidder or target more than once for each potential counterpart and not weigh 
our regressions incorrectly due to identical balance sheet data. Appending the target-, acquirer- and 
non-merger samples completes our dataset used in the empirical the analyses.   
From CCM we link balance sheet and price data to our sample, for earnings forecasts we 
turn to the I/B/E/S database. We obtain the mean analysts forecast at the point in time when the 
forecasts become the one-year forecast for the first time. In other words, the first forecast with 
forecast period end date (fpedats) from I/B/E/S one year after the financial data reporting date 
(datadate) from CCM. We merge in the EPS forecasts using eight-digit historical CUSIP and 
financial year (where the financial year from I/B/E/S is found by subtracting one year from fpedats). 
Many of the firms in our total sample do not find a match in the I/B/E/S database resulting in a 
significant reduction of observations when counting EPS accretive bidders and targets compared 
to book bidders and targets. As an alternative approach, we could have attempted to obtain 
additional matches by matching on tickers and company names. However, the ticker provided by 
I/B/E/S may change over time and/or be reused. Therefore, even if a match was found, it was not 
necessarily with the right firm. Since the sample is already sufficiently large to produce statistically 
significant results (196,666 firm years), we valued the certainty in the correctness of the data more 
than increasing the sample size slightly. 
Our dataset construction was conducted manually using Stata, and is most likely in practice 
somewhat different from Garvey et al’s (2013) procedure (in regards to features of the software). 
We have included a comparison of the stages during the process where Garvey et al (2013) provide 
sample sizes, please see Appendix 11.1.1 for details. 
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7. Empirical Specification and Key Variables 
In this section, we begin by defining our variables and refine our controls. Then we continue 
by summarizing descriptive statistics as well as univariate findings from our initial empirical 
prediction that the likelihood of being a target is increasing with the number of viable bidders.    
7.1 Empirical Specification 
We follow the probit regression model for merger likelihood developed in Garvey et al (2013): 
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗)            (7) 
 
Where the subscript i refers to firm i, subscript t refers to time in years and subscript j refers 
to industry j. 𝜇𝑡 refers to time fixed effects and 𝑣𝑗  refers to industry fixed effects. Using the 
regression of target likelihood found in Table 2 we illustrate the equation in practice. In this case, 
the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 would take the value 1 if firm i was a target in year t, otherwise 0. The 
corresponding V is the number of viable bidders for the target measured by either book or EPS 
values for firm i in year t-1. X are the related control variables presented in Table 1 Panel C-1 
including firm i’s size, leverage, price to book ratio, price to forecasted earnings ratio etc. Z is the 
level and standard deviation of the related key variable within the industry at year t. W is the number 
of takeovers taking place in firm i’s industry j in year t-1. In the regressions for likelihood of using 
stock as a method of payment y is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the deal was financed 
only by stock, otherwise 0.   
7.2 Test Variables 
When computing the number of viable bidders for each firm we assume that any potential 
bidder will pay for the target with their own equity based on Q-theory and equation (6). Using our 
total sample of acquirers, targets and non-merger firms, we calculate for each firm each year the 
number of firms that are able to make an equity-financed deal, which is earnings per share accretive 
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when paying a 20% premium to the target. For example, we consider 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 as a viable bidder for 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 if it uses its stock to pay a 20% premium for 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0’s equity (in market value terms) and 
the resulting earnings per share of 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴 increase after the acquisition. 
Explained in more technical terms, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 is considered to be an earnings per share 
accretive bidder for 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 in year t if 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1’s price over forecasted earnings ratio (P/FE1) in year 
t is 1.2 (referring to a 20% premium) times that of 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0’s (P/FE0) and they are both in the same 
two digit SIC industry.  
 
     
𝑃/𝐹𝐸1−𝑃/𝐹𝐸0
𝑃/𝐹𝐸0
>
0.2𝐾0
𝑠(𝐾1+𝐾0)−𝐾1
                           (8) 
 
Based on the assumption that the acquirer expects the market to attach his multiple to the entire 
post-merge entity, an arguably extreme bootstrapping effect, applying 𝑠 = 1 results in the equation: 
 
        𝑃/𝐹𝐸1 > (1.2) × 𝑃/𝐹𝐸0             (9)
        
In most of our analysis we apply lagged values as this paper is trying to convey insight into 
the possibility of predicting merger activity ex ante. The mean of analysts’ earnings per share 
forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S database as proxy for expected earnings in our 
computations. We only use forecasts one year out.  
I/B/E/S typically update their database with new forecasts each month and since Garvey et 
al’s (2013) analyses are done on a yearly basis they only rely on one particular month’s forecast. 
They choose the month in which the forecasted date becomes the one-year forecast for the first 
time. This usually happens the month a given firm publishes their financial reports and the analysts 
shift their attention to forecasting the next year’s EPS. By following this method, we should be able 
to capture the new information available in the beginning of the financial year in question. When 
counting viable bidders and targets based on EPS, we exclude firms with negative earnings and 
denote them Accretive Bidders and Accretive Targets.  
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Summary statistics from our analysis of accretive bidders and targets are presented in Table 
1 Panel B-1, including median and mean values for each of our three samples (numbers from the 
original paper are in Panel B-2). We run a simple multivariate regression without any controls 
shown in Panel 1 of Table A. The results clearly portray that our median number of accretive 
bidders has a strong positive and significant relationship to the number of public firms actually 
being taken over on a yearly basis. Based on the same sample as the regression, Figure 2 highlights 
the same message. Namely, that the median value of accretive bidders the same and the prior year, 
moves closely with the number of actual takeovers taking place.      
We follow the same methodology to run an analogous exercise using book values. For 
example, we consider 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 as viable book bidder for 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 if it uses its stock to pay a 20% 
premium for 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0’s equity (in market value terms) and the resulting book value per share of 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 increases after the acquisition. In practice this means that, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1 is considered to be a book 
value per share accretive bidder for 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0 in year t if 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚1’s price-to-book ratio (P/B1) in year t 
is 1.2 (referring to a 20% premium) times that of 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚0’s (P/B0) and they are both in the same two 
digit SIC industry.  
 
         
𝑃/𝐵1−𝑃/𝐵0
𝑃/𝐵0
>
0.2𝐾0
𝑠(𝐾1+𝐾0)−𝐾1
             (10) 
 
Based on the same assumption previously introduced, the acquirer expects the market to 
attach his multiple to the entire post-merge entity, an arguably extreme bootstrapping effect, 
applying 𝑠 = 1 results in the equation:  
 
𝑃/𝐵1 > (1.2)𝑃/𝐵0              (11) 
 
We exclude firms with negative book values of equity since it is hard to interpret their 
economic meaning. We denote the number of viable bidders for each firm based on book values as 
Book Bidders and the number of viable targets for each firm as Book Targets.  
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As the focus of this paper is to replicate Garvey et al (2013), we use the same approach for 
measuring viable bidders and targets. However, one could argue that this is a somewhat crude 
approach. For further work, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of using other, more 
comprehensive, ways of measuring accretion.  
7.3 Control Variables 
As pointed out in the introduction of this paper, a range of studies on the different aspects 
of merger likelihood have been performed. The findings imply that there are many possible drivers 
for mergers. Therefore, we apply an exhaustive set of controls highlighted in existing merger 
prediction literature, in line with those presented in Garvey et al (2013), to isolate and affirm the 
paper’s intended contribution. We include all the controls in Garvey et al (2013) except the RIM 
measures.  
Since the likelihood of being a target is shown to be positively related to the stock price to 
earnings ratio (Harford, 1999), we use this as a control. Cremers et al (2009) show that leverage 
has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of being a target. Hasbrouck (1985) however 
does not find this statistically significant. To control for this, we include leverage measured as the 
book value of debt divided by total assets. According to past studies (Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 
1986; Mikkelson & Partch 1989), the size of the firm is negatively related to the likelihood of being 
a target. Varieties of different size measures exist, but we use the natural logarithm of assets as 
proxy for size in our regressions. Finally, as our main control variables, we adopt the valuation 
measures presented in the misvaluation paper by Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005). 
These components are derived from the assumption presented by Rhodes-Kropf & 
Viswanathan (2004) that a firm has a true value (V) which can differ from the market value (M) 
and book value (B), thus for any measure of value we can use the following algebraic identity to 
decompose the misvaluation: 
 
𝑚 − 𝑏 = (𝑚 − 𝑣) + (𝑣 − 𝑏)                     (12)  
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 Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) takes the breakdown of 𝑚 − 𝑏 further suggesting that one 
component of 𝑚 − 𝑣 is shared by all firms in a given sector or market, while another component 
of 𝑚 − 𝑣 is firm-specific. Thus separating it into three components: firm-specific error, industry 
time-series error and long-run value-to-book error. The approach to estimating 𝑣 involves 
expressing 𝑣 as a linear function of firm-specific accounting information at a point in time, 𝜃𝑖𝑡, and 
a vector of conditional accounting multiples, 𝛼, 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼).  
Rewriting equation (12): 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = (𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗𝑡)) + (𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗)) + (𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡)           (13) 
 
 
                                                         𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗𝑡)              (14) 
 
Represents the firm-specific error, which captures purely firm-specific deviations from 
fundamental value. 
 
𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗)             (15) 
 
Represents the time-series error, when this figure is high, the sector wide valuation wave is near its 
peak. 
 
           𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡              (16) 
 
Represents the difference between long-run value and book value. 
27 
Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) develop three separate models to identify the misvaluation 
components. Our control variables are based on the most comprehensive model, Model III6, 
including Market Value, Book Value, Net income and Leverage7. 
 
    𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑗𝑡ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝛼3𝑗𝑡𝐼(<0)ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝛼4𝑗𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡            (17) 
 
To obtain 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ?̂?𝑗𝑡) we use fitted values from equation (17): 
 
𝑣(𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡; ?̂?0𝑗𝑡 , ?̂?1𝑗𝑡, ?̂?2𝑗𝑡 , ?̂?3𝑗𝑡, ?̂?4𝑗𝑡) = ?̂?0𝑗𝑡 + ?̂?1𝑗𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑗𝑡 ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ +
?̂?3𝑗𝑡𝐼<0 ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + ?̂?4𝑗𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡                 (18) 
 
To obtain 𝑣(𝜃𝑖𝑡; ?̂?𝑗), we average over time 
1
𝑇
∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑡 = ?̅?𝑗 for 𝛼𝑘, 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and calculate: 
 
𝑣(𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡; ?̅?0𝑗 , ?̅?1𝑗 , ?̅?2𝑗 , ?̅?3𝑗 , ?̅?4𝑗) = ?̅?0𝑗 + ?̅?1𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡 + ?̅?2𝑗 ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ +
?̅?3𝑗𝐼<0 ln(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + ?̅?4𝑗𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡                 (19) 
 
One can argue that several other valuation metrics have been suggested as alternative 
controls8. However, since the valuation decomposition by Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) overlap most 
of these, they seem to be sufficient to affirm our papers intended contribution. We also include 
                                                 
6 The lower case letters are values expressed in natural logs, whilst the upper case letters are standard units. 
7 NI+ stands for the absolute value of net income and I(<0) ln(NI)+ is an indicator function for negative net income observations. 
LEV is the leverage ratio, measured debt to total assets 
8 Hashbrouck (1985) uses market/book and argues that low values of this measure may indicate incompetent managers and low cost 
for acquirers. He also adds liquidity as a control variable as it is easier for an acquirer to get ownership in a liquid target. Cremers 
et al (2009) find that ROA (return on assets) is negatively related to the likelihood of being a target. Further, they control for Tobin’s 
q and find a negative relationship to the target likelihood. 
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these misvaluation components in our regressions for acquirer likelihood, as we expect them to 
have the opposite effects than in target likelihood regressions.  
In line with merger wave literature by Gorton et al (2009) we continue by counting the total 
number of takeovers within each two-digit SIC code each year. Figure 2 highlights the generally 
agreed proposition that mergers happen more frequently in booming markets. To make sure our 
results are robust against picking up year effects or simply being caused by shocks affecting the 
entire economy or some industries, we control for industry- and year fixed effects and cluster the 
standard errors at the industry level when running our regressions. When shocks hit the entire 
economy or industry, we see the occurrence of overall stock price movements. However, in this 
paper we are only interested in how shocks create movement in relative stock price misvaluation 
and how this relates to observed merger activity.  
We include industry dispersion (measured by interdecile range and standard deviation) of 
both the valuation metrics we consider (price-to-book and price-to-earnings) as additional controls 
to make sure our results are not driven by any changes to the industry as a whole. Figure 2 
reinforces this claim by showing the positive relation between the movement of price to book (i.e. 
price-to-book) dispersion and the number of deals each year. Finally, we include the number of 
firms in the industry as an additional control. This is because the number of viable bidders, unlike 
dispersion statistics, is related to the sheer number of firms in the industry.          
7.4 Summary Statistics 
In this section, we start by discussing our summary statistics presented in the five panels of 
Table 1 and how they match up with Garvey et al’s (2013) original results. We focus on the lagged 
values in each of the acquirer, target and non-merger sample. Finishing off, we take a closer look 
at takeover activity in three selected industries. 
From Panel B-1 we can see that the median number of both accretive and book bidders are 
significantly larger in the target sample than in the other two, acquirer- and non-merger sample. 
E.g., in the panel we can see that firms in the acquirer- and non-merger samples have a median of 
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only 32 and 51 potential accretive bidders (Lag Accretive Bidders) 9, respectively, whereas firms in 
the target sample have a median of 61. Garvey et al’s (2013) results displayed in Panel B-2 portray 
results drawing a similar conclusion with a median number of potential bidders of 83 for the target 
sample, 50 for the non-merger sample and 68 for the acquirer sample. 
Furthermore, in line with Garvey et al’s (2013) results, we additionally find that the median 
number of viable targets in the acquirer sample, 61, is significantly greater than the other two 
samples, 34 and 33. This indicates strongly that our estimates of number of viable bidders and 
targets can participate in predicting if a firm ultimately becomes an acquirer or target10. We note 
that our mean and median values for both targets and bidders are lower than in the original paper; 
however, this only reflects the fact that we have smaller sample sizes.  
The distribution of the data in the three samples are highly right-skewed. Therefore, when 
running the regressions, we follow Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) and transform the independent 
variables with the Cumulative Density Function (CDF)11 for normalization purposes.  
Applying the simple model, introduced by Garvey et al (2013), and presented earlier, with 
the observed probability of being a takeover target in the whole sample 3.21%12 and the median 
number of EPS bidders for the entire sample (34) we estimate the fraction of the bidder population 
which do not believe in the bootstrap game based on the formula 1 − 𝑋34 = 3.21%. This results 
in a fraction of bidders who do not believe in the bootstrap game of 99.90%. If we apply this number 
with the median number of EPS bidders for the target sample (61) the probability for being a target 
increases with 2.48 percentage points to 5.69%, which is fairly close to the marginal effects of 
0.030, 0.032 and 0.030 found in the three columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.  
                                                 
9 Variable names from the tables in parenthesis 
10 Using a simple T-Test. The mean differences are all significant at the 1% level 
11 The Cumulative Density Function describes the probability that a real-valued random variable X with a given probability 
distribution will be found to have a value less than, or equal to X. 
12 The observed probability of being a takeover target is found by dividing the number of targets by the size of the total sample. 
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When applying their numbers to the simple model above, Garvey et al (2013) find that the 
probability of being a target increases to 6.11%. This is slightly higher than our results, but 
significantly closer to their marginal effects of 0.053, 0.054 and 0.058. A potential explanation for 
our somewhat larger deviation from the marginal effects, compared to what is found in the original 
paper, is that our industry number of takeovers (Lag Ind Num Takeover) has coefficients ranging 
from 0.020 to 0.021, all significant at the 1% level. While this is evident throughout all our 
regressions, theirs are not.  
Panel C-1 of Table 1 reports the lagged means and medians of our control variables. 
Examining the target and the non-merger sample there are no obvious differences in the values 
except for the merger wave variable, industry number of takeovers, and the price over forecasted 
earnings ratio (Lag P/FE). As pointed out earlier, the number of takeovers in the industry is one of 
the most significant variables in our regressions for predicting merger likelihood. Our summary 
statistics are thus consistent with our regression findings, and mostly in line with Garvey et al 
(2013), showing that actual takeovers to a greater extent take place in the industries of our actual 
targets and acquirers. Contradicting Garvey et al’s (2013) results displayed in Panel C-2, we fail 
to identify notable differences in the number of firms in the industry (Lag Ind Num Firms) between 
the target and non-merger sample.  
Turning our attention to the differences between the mean values of the acquirer- and the 
non-merger sample, we find that they are mostly significant and almost always at the 1% level. The 
most striking differences are in size (Lag Size), P/FE ratio (Lag P/FE) and industry number of 
takeovers (Lag Ind Num Takeover) where, in line with Garvey et al (2013), we see that acquirers 
are both larger, have a higher P/FE ratio and are situated in industries with higher takeover rates 
than the firms in the non-merger sample. This is in accordance with existing literature; hence, the 
variables are arguably relevant controls for our tests. Further, we find that acquirers tend to have 
higher firm-specific error (Lag Firm Specific Error) meaning that acquirers are more overvalued 
(positively misvalued) than non-merger firms due to intrinsic factors. Our numbers are notably 
higher than Garvey et al’s (2013). They identify a difference in the means of the non-merger and 
acquirer sample’s firm-specific error of 0.06 in Panel C-2, whilst our data result in a difference of 
0.19. Further, contradicting Garvey et al’s (2013) results, our number of firms in the industry for 
the acquirer sample fails to deviate notably from the non-merger sample.  
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Highlighting what we see in Figure 1, these differences have already provided valuable 
information to ex ante identify the likelihood of being an acquirer, and therefore the number of 
viable targets does not stand out as the only relevant variable when attempting to predict the 
acquirers. The differences between the mean values of the merger- and non-merger samples further 
highlight the importance of the number of takeovers in the industry as pointed out earlier.   
Panel D of Table 1 portrays the correlations between the applied test variables. The book 
bidders and book targets are correlated at a 61.5% level indicating that the viability measures are 
accounting for different facets of managerial behavior. The correlation between accretive and book 
targets are very similar to that of the bidders at 61.3% and the correlation between viable targets 
and bidders are low, which are both in line with Garvey et al (2013) and to be expected. 
Another important finding in Panel D of Table 1 is the high correlations between the 
measures of viable targets and acquirers, and the number of takeovers in each industry. This is 
however a natural result as we count for viable bidders and targets at the firm level and the count 
is restricted to firms within the same industry. We define industries by two-digit SIC codes, and 
according to Garvey et al (2013), the results should not be overly sensitive to the choice of industry 
classification.  
Panel E of Table 1 portrays the correlations between merger rates and median number of 
accretive- and book bidders per firm, by industry, and by industry-year consecutively. There is a 
strong positive linear and monotonic relationship between the measures accretive- and book 
bidders, and the merger rates. The Spearman correlations (ρ) are 0.94 and 0.96 and the Pearson 
correlations (r) are 0.96 and 0.93. As the Spearman coefficient is positive, we can conclude that a 
greater number of viable bidders are associated with a greater number of takeovers. The merger 
rate by industry may not capture the dynamics of the merger activities, so we furthermore analyze 
the correlations based on industry each year. The Spearman- and Pearson correlations drop to 0.71, 
0.73 and 0.83, 0.80 consecutively. Based on these correlations our methodology seems to work 
well in identifying hotbeds of merger activity. This prediction is different from the merger wave 
approach, as by construction the merger wave does not make predictions until after actual mergers 
have taken place (Garvey et al, 2013). Our correlation results are notably larger than the original 
paper’s, indicating that our data sample provides a stronger relationship between these variables.   
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Moving on from the summary statistics, we now shift our focus to the time-series of mergers 
in three of the most active industries; Depository Institutions, Business Services and Electronic and 
other Electrical Equipment and Components, except Computer Equipment. In line with Garvey et 
al (2013), Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how the lagged number of viable bidders relates to actual 
takeovers in the industries each year. We find analogous results that the merger wave variables and 
our measures of viable bidders tell a similar story in both industries. Book bidders however, seem 
to be even more closely related to industry takeovers for Depository Institutions than the accretive 
bidders are. Garvey et al (2013) argue that the rapid increase in the number of firms in Figure 3 
was caused by a large number of mutual banks going public in the 1990s. They claim that this also 
caused an increase in merger activity and that there is a clear relationship between industry number 
of firms and takeovers in the industry. The relationship however does not seem to be as clear in our 
results. Another point of interest shown in these figures is that the number of firms in the industries 
varies notably over time. Combined with the facts that the number of firms in the industry and the 
number of viable bidders and targets in the takeover and acquirer samples are larger than that in 
the non-merger sample and the two numbers are highly correlated suggests that we should also 
include number of firms in the industry as a control variable in our tests.   
To further investigate the relationship between the number of firms and takeovers in an 
industry each year we add a third industry, Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, except Computer Equipment. Figure 5 portrays the same measures as Figures 3 and 
4 while we scale the number of firms and takeovers in Figure 6 to provide a more illustrative 
depiction of the trends. The graphs show that the number of takeovers is considerably more volatile 
than the sheer number of firms and there is no obvious relationship between the two.    
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8. Main Empirical Results 
With the data construction process complete, we proceed in testing the initial results identified in 
Figure 1 and Panel A of Table 1. 
8.1 Predicting Takeover Targets Based on Number of Viable Bidders 
Testing their first hypothesis (𝐻1), if the likelihood of being a takeover target increases with the 
number of viable bidder firms, we run probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is a takeover target and 0 otherwise. We transform the 
independent variables using the cumulative distribution function (CFD), to achieve comparability 
between the coefficients, cluster the standard errors at the industry level and control for year- and 
industry fixed effects. The results are presented as marginal effects in the tables.  
Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2 show the effect of the number of viable accretive bidders 
the previous year (Lag Accretive Bidders) on the probability of being a takeover target. Column (1) is 
the baseline regression with controls for the standard deviation of the target’s industry price over 
forecasted earnings ratio (Ind P/FE SD) alongside other relevant variables. The second column replaces 
the standard deviation with the interdecile range of P/FE (Ind P/FE Interdecile). The interdecile range 
is the range between the P/FE of the firms at the 90th- and 10th percentile in a given industry. The third 
column includes the three Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) misvaluation components. 
Strongly in support of the first hypothesis, we observe that the lagged number of accretive 
bidders are highly relevant for predicting the likelihood of being a target across all regressions. The 
coefficients are all positive and significant at the 1% level. Examining the marginal effects of the probit 
regressions, illustrates the significance of the findings. The coefficients of the accretive bidders in 
column (1), (2) and (3) of the marginal regression vary between 0.030 and 0.032, implying that if the 
number of viable bidders rises from the median of the CFD transformed variable to the maximum, the 
probability of being a target increases with (0,5 x 3.2%) = 1,6%. The magnitudes of the marginal effects 
for accretive bidders in our regressions are somewhat lower than the corresponding coefficients 
presented in the original paper ranging from 0.053 to 0.058. However, they are still significant and 
highly relevant. Further, we find that some of our controls seem to contribute to explaining the 
probability of being a target far better than in the original paper. The following paragraphs review these 
in more detail. 
34 
The coefficient of the number of takeovers in a firm's industry the previous year (Lag Ind Num 
Takeover) is both positive and significant at the 1% level ranging from 0.020 to 0.021, thus increasing 
the likelihood of being a target. This is supported by existing merger wave literature (Thakor & Goel, 
2010; Gorton et al, 2009) and is both significant at a higher level and with a greater coefficient in our 
regressions than the original paper’s non-significant coefficients ranging from 0.008 to 0.009.  
Our results show that the number of firms in the industry (Lag Ind Num Firms) is not relevant 
in the prediction model, however the original paper have found a slightly negative significant 
coefficient ranging from -0.010 to -0.012. This is surprising as it suggests more firms in an industry 
lowers the probability of being a target, which seems counterintuitive and conflicting with the summary 
statistics.  
Furthermore, our P/FE (Lag P/FE) ratio findings also contradict the original paper. Negative 
coefficients ranging from -0.023 to -0.037, significant at the 1% level, suggest that a firm with low 
P/FE has a significantly higher chance of being a target. Garvey et al (2013) do not find significant 
P/FE coefficients when controlling for accretive bidders. Our results are supported by Fuller & Jensen 
(2002) who argue that some CEOs engage in an earnings game and may mistakenly or carelessly 
acquire low P/FE firms believing that the market will apply the acquirer’s high multiple for the 
combined entity. 
We find that the firm-specific error (Lag Firm Specific Error), based on Rhodes-Kropf et al’s 
(2005) misvaluation decomposition, increases the likelihood of being a target in all regressions with 
coefficients ranging from 0.09 to 0.017, similar to the findings of Garvey et al (2013) ranging from 
0.012 to 0.014. This refers to cases in which a firm is overvalued due to pricing error of its own 
characteristics, and there is a discrepancy between its market- and fundamental value.  
 The effect of firm size (Lag Size) in our regression needs further explanation. Earlier literature 
agrees upon that small firms are likely to be targets. However Harford (1999), when applying the log 
value of the firm’s assets as proxy for size, finds that the coefficient is not significant. Splitting our 
sample in two, at the median of firm size, indicates a non-linear relationship as we find that the 
coefficients for the sub samples have opposite signs. The original paper reports the same findings. As 
the effect of size on merger activity is not a primary issue in the original paper, we follow Garvey et al 
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(2013) and choose to simply add the square of size (Lag Size Square) to control for this non-linear 
relationship, resulting in insignificant sign and size of these coefficients13.  
Following our EPS bootstrap results, we test whether the likelihood of being a target increases 
by the number of viable book bidders. Column (4) portrays these results with the relevant controls. We 
find that the magnitude of the marginal effect of book bidders (Lag Book Bidders), 0.025, is slightly 
lower than for the accretive bidders, 0.030 and significant at the 1% level. We find a similar reduction 
in Garvey et al (2013) as their coefficient drops from 0.058 to 0.016. All the Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) 
misvaluation components turn positive and significant at the 1% level and the magnitude of the negative 
P/FE coefficient increases to -0.086. 
We find some conflicting results from the original paper regarding the long-run value-to-book 
(Lag Long Run V to B) component of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005), as this coefficient is only significant 
in our regression presented in column (4), when applying book bidders (as we will return to later) as 
the main independent variable, with a magnitude of 0.010. Garvey et al (2013) report a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient across the board, ranging from -0.006 to -0.022. Our results however, 
are somewhat in line with the findings of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) that low long-run value-to-book 
firms tend to acquire high long-run value-to-book targets. An argument in support of this 
proposition is that large firms with low expected future earnings acquire smaller firms with high 
expected earnings, in an attempt to increase their future expected earnings. 
In column (5) we estimate the model controlling for both accretive- and book bidders. The 
impact of accretive bidders drops slightly from 0.030 to 0.027, and book bidders drops from 0.025 to 
0.011, both still significant at the 1% level.  
In line with the original paper, the number of viable accretive bidders seems to go a long way 
in explaining the likelihood of being a target. Other controls in our results seem to additionally carry a 
greater predictive power than in the original paper, such as previously mentioned industry number of 
takeovers and P/FE.  
                                                 
13 In unreported results we ran the regressions without the size square variable, resulting in a negative significant size measure for 
targets and the opposite for the acquirer sample 
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Overall, the results presented in Table 2 are in line with the findings in Garvey et al (2013). 
They show strong support of the first hypothesis, that a firm is more likely to be a target if there are 
more viable accretive- and, although to a lesser extent, book bidders. We note that our measures remain 
strongly significant when including standard controls as well as the three Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) 
misvaluation factors and Hardford’s (2005) adjustment for the non-linear size variable. 
8.2 Predicting Acquireres Based on the Number of Viable Targets 
Next, we shift our attention to the models ability to predict the likelihood of being an 
acquirer. Table 3 reports our results applying accretive targets (Lag Accretive Targets) as the main 
variable of interest, whilst adding other relevant variables as controls. Following Garvey et al 
(2013), we run probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm is an acquirer and 0 otherwise. As in Table 2 the results reported are the 
marginal effects, the independent variables are CFD transformed, standard errors are clustered at 
the industry level and we control for year- and industry fixed effects.  
The first regression displayed in column (1), includes only our main variable of interest, 
accretive targets. We find a marginal effect of 0.029 significant at the 1% level, similar to Garvey 
et al’s (2013) coefficient of 0.032, suggesting that the likelihood of being a bidder is positively 
related to the number of viable targets.  
In column (2), additional controls are added and the marginal effect of accretive targets 
drops to 0.015 but remains significant at the 1% level. Other control variables seem to have greater 
significance when attempting to predict if a firm becomes a bidder. The wave variable, (Lag Ind 
Num Takeover) has a marginal effect coefficient of 0.052, which is larger than the accretive targets 
variable and significant at the 1% level. This variable is clearly successful in predicting a bidder, 
even more so than predicting a target. Garvey et al (2013) report a somewhat similar result with a 
positive and significant coefficient for the merger wave variable. Their coefficients however are 
notably lower ranging from 0.009 to 0.010. 
When we add control variables intended to capture misvaluation effects, i.e. P/FE and 
Rhodes-Kropf et al’s (2005) three misvaluation components in column (3), (4) and (5), the number 
of accretive targets loses its predictive power and is longer no longer significant. In line with the 
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original paper, accretive targets lose its significance when controlling for P/FE in columns (3) and 
(4). Our P/FE results however, contradict the original paper, as they are not statistically significant. 
We furthermore reach the same conclusions when adding the interdecile dispersion of the price to 
earnings variable in column (4).   
In column (5) we add the three Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) misvaluation measures revealing 
where these components really come into effect. Namely, as seen in Garvey et al’s (2013) original 
paper, they show strong predictive power to the likelihood of being a bidder. Controlling for these 
variables do not reduce the magnitude of the other controls notably, but contribute additional 
predictive power. This is especially true for the firm-specific error and long-run value-to-book with 
coefficients of 0.035 and 0.020 respectively, both being significant at the 1% level. The time-series 
error (Lag Time Series Error) however, is not significant. Our results provide stronger support of 
this conclusion than the original paper, especially regarding the relevance of the firm-specific error 
with a coefficient at a higher significance level and with a greater value of 0.035 compared to their 
0.010. 
These results are in accordance with the findings of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005), which 
conclude that when a firm itself has a temporarily elevated firm-specific misvaluation, it is more 
likely to be a bidder. The high and significant long-run value-to-book coefficient is in line with 
traditional Q-theory arguing that firms with high growth opportunities should buy firms with lower 
growth opportunities (Dong et al, 2006).  
As reported in Table 2, the firms leverage ratio (Lag Leverage) was deemed not significant 
when predicting the likelihood of being a target. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Hasbrouck (1985). However, when predicting the likelihood of being an acquirer, in line with 
Garvey et al (2013), all of our regressions show a negative relationship significant at the 1% level. 
This suggests that the likelihood of being an acquirer is reduced as a firm’s leverage increases, 
which can be supported by the findings of Billett & Qian (2005). The original paper’s results 
support this conclusion but estimate a considerably smaller coefficient, ranging from -0.002 to -
0.009, compared to ours. We find the coefficients ranging from -0.17 to -0.19, suggesting that 
Garvey et al (2013) underestimate the impact of leverage. 
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To sum up, we find similar results as Garvey et al (2013), namely that the number of viable 
targets available, to some extent, may contribute in predicting which firms will be an acquirer. 
However, the results are far less impressive than the target results. The main contributors in 
predicting the bidders seem to be the two Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) measures of misvaluation, 
firm-specific error and long-run value-to-book, as well as the number of takeovers in the industry 
and the firms leverage ratio. Our results somewhat deviate from the original paper, as the predictive 
power of the mentioned variables are greater in magnitude in our results than theirs. In addition, 
we are successful in identifying leverage as a significant predictor for the likelihood of being an 
acquirer.  
8.3 Predicting Merger Activity at Firm and Industry Levels 
Next, we shift our focus to the models ability to predict merger activity at the firm and 
industry level. We run probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the firm was either a takeover acquirer or target, and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables are CFD transformed, standard errors are clustered at the industry level and we control 
for year- and industry fixed effects. The marginal effects are displayed in Table 4.  
We observe in the first regression, reported in column (1) without applying any controls, 
that the coefficient for both accretive bidders and targets are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Garvey et al (2013) report an accretive targets coefficient of similar magnitude, however our 
accretive bidders coefficient (0.070) is substantially greater than theirs (0.046). When adding the 
merger wave control variable to the regression our coefficient of accretive targets loses its 
significance. This contradicts the original paper’s findings where the accretive targets variable is 
robust to the merger wave control. Our results suggest that the number of takeovers in the industry, 
which is positive and significant at the 1% level, does a better job at predicting if a firm will be 
involved in a takeover than the number of accretive targets.  
Turning our attention to the valuation measures of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005), we see that 
our estimated coefficients are quite similar, in both size and direction, to the ones found in Garvey 
et al (2013). As shown in column (3), we find that the firm-specific error and long-run value-to-
book are significant at the 1% level with respectively positive and negative signs. Our firm-specific 
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error coefficient of 0.039 is estimated to have substantially higher predictive power than in their 
results, showing a coefficient of only 0.018. The coefficients are slightly lower than reported in 
Table 9 of Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005), however Garvey et al (2013) argue that this result stems 
from applying a finer industry partition (we apply SIC codes whereas Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) 
rely on Fama-French 12 industry classification) and a longer sample period.  
In line with Garvey et al (2013), the industry number of takeovers coefficient, is positive 
and significant when only including controls for these three misvaluation measures. We observe 
that our coefficient is significantly higher, with a value of 0.068 compared to Garvey et al’s (2013) 
0.021. When adding back the measures of viable bidders and targets in columns (4) and (5) we find 
a similar pattern as before. Accretive bidders stay positive and significant following both Garvey 
et al (2013) and Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) and have incremental power to predict merger intensities 
at the firm level. Garvey et al (2013) report that the coefficient of long-run value-to-book is negative 
and significant across the board, though our results suggest that firm-specific error and accretive 
bidders are more important measures when trying to predict merger intensity at the firm level, 
cancelling out the long-run value-to-book’s significance.   
Next, in line with the original paper, we investigate whether our measures of viable bidders 
also predict merger waves at the industry level. The level of the industry merger wave is defined 
as the number of merger announcements in each industry every year. Following Garvey et al (2013) 
we run OLS panel regressions where our model’s key predictive variable is the average number of 
accretive bidders in each industry each year (Lag Ind Average Accretive Bidders). We include 
several controls, such as the Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) measures and the number of firms in the 
industry each year. Finally, we use lagged values in all regressions and control for year and industry 
fixed effects both in the regressions and with control variables. The results are reported in Table 5. 
The first column (1) shows that our key variable of interest, the average number of accretive 
bidders in the industry, has a greater predictive power than Garvey et al (2013). We find a 
coefficient of 0.287 significant at the 1% level, compared to their coefficient of 0.193. In column 
(2), unlike Garvey et al (2013), we find that the number of firms in the industry is negatively related 
to the merger intensity. All though our results effect is marginal and only significant at the 10% 
level, Garvey et al (2013) find a positive coefficient of 0.0114 significant at the 1% level. Garvey 
et al (2013) furthermore illustrate these findings of a positive relationship between merger intensity 
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and the sheer number of firms in the industry in their Figure 3, showing the development over time 
for Depository Institutions. They argue that a large number of mutual banks went public in the 
1990s, driving more merger activity. However, the relationship does not seem to be that clear. For 
example, in the period 1982-1992 the number of firms in the industry almost triples, whereas the 
merger intensity remains almost constant. Further, as shown in Figure 6 displaying a scaled plot of 
the two variables for Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and Components except Computer 
Equipment, there does not seem to be an obvious relationship in the trends. This supports our 
findings that the number of firms in the industry not necessarily plays a significant role in predicting 
merger intensity.  
In columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) we sequentially include the industry average price-to-book 
ratio (Lag Ind Average P/B), total number of mergers in the previous year (Total Mergers 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1) 
and the total number of mergers in the industry (Total Mergers 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗) using the last two as control 
variables for fixed effects. We observe that consistently across all panels, in line with Garvey et al 
(2013), the coefficient for our measure of the industry average accretive bidders remain positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Lastly, in columns (7), (8), (9) and (10) we include the Rhodes-
Kropf et al (2005) measures of industry average time-series error (Lag Ind Average Time Series 
Error) and industry average long-run value-to-book ratio (Lag Ind Average Long Run V to B) as 
controls. Our primary variable, as in the original paper, remains a strong and significant predictor 
of industry level merger intensity. Note however that the coefficient drops slightly when manually 
controlling for industry fixed effects, lowering the R-squared, suggesting that accounting for fixed 
effects in the regressions provide better results.  
8.4 Predicting the Medium of Exchange 
We now shift our attention to the second hypothesis (𝐻2), namely that the number of viable 
bidders and targets are related to the use of stock as the medium of exchange in the acquisition.  
In line with Garvey et al (2013), the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the deal only uses stock as a method of payment, and 0 otherwise. We run probit 
regressions controlling for year- and industry fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the 
target’s industry level. Following Garvey et al (2013), as an additional control variable to those 
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applied in previous regressions, we add a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the deal is a tender 
offer. Existing literature furthermore finds that this is generally relevant for the choice of medium 
of payment (Garvey et al, 2013). In each regression, we pair the acquirer’s number of viable targets 
with the target’s number of viable bidders. As earlier, we CFD transform the independent non-
dummy variables in the regression analysis and report the marginal effects in Table 6 Panel A. 
Several of the controls are not reported in the table partially due to space limitations, but primarily 
because they are less relevant for the conclusions reached. This procedure mimics the one in Garvey 
et al (2013). 
We report the results based on accretive bidders and targets in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) 
of Table 6 Panel A. In line with the work of Dong et al (2006), we include the target firms’ 
corresponding acquirer’s attributes in the tests. Hence, we report the number of viable targets and 
bidders for both the target and the acquirer. In column (1), as proxy for dispersion, we use the 
standard deviation of the target’s industry price to forecasted earnings ratio, whereas in column (2), 
(3) and (4) rely on the interdecile range of the target’s industry price to forecasted earnings ratio.  
From columns (1) and (2) we observe that there is a positive relationship between the 
target’s accretive bidders (Lag Target Accretive Bidders) and targets (Lag Target Accretive 
Targets) with the probability of the transaction being stock financed. However, the target measure 
is not significant. Garvey et al (2013) report that the positive relationship between the use of stock 
as a payment and the number of accretive targets is in accordance with existing literature. 
Specifically the proposition that a high number of accretive targets for the target firms indicate that 
when the target’s valuation is elevated, it is also more likely to receive and accept stock as a method 
of payment. Surprisingly, we observe in Garvey et al’s (2013) tables that the coefficient of their 
marginal effects in columns (1) and (2) are not significant, hence, they carry no predictive power 
to underscore their conclusion. Our regressions also fail to confirm the number of accretive targets 
for a target to be significant in predicting method of payment. The target’s number of accretive 
bidders however, carries significant predictive power with coefficients ranging from 0.271 to 0.285. 
A large number of accretive bidders might suggest that the target is, at least relative to other 
firms, undervalued. This is in line with Schleifer & Vishny (2003) who find that relatively 
overvalued bidders are more likely to use stock as a method of payment in the acquisition of 
undervalued targets.  
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In column (3) we add the three mispricing measures from Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) for the 
targets. We find that all three are positively related to the use of stock as the method of payment, 
though time-series error (Lag Target Time Series Error) and long-run value-to-book (Lag Target 
Long Run V to B) are not significant. Garvey et al (2013) identify opposite results, as they find 
time-series error and long-run value-to-book to be positive and significant, whilst the target’s firm-
specific error (Lag Target Firm Specific Error) is not.  
In column (4) we add the corresponding measures for the acquirers. We can see that the 
target’s number of accretive bidders and accretive targets remain positive (although accretive 
targets is not significant), while the acquirer’s own number of accretive targets (Lag Acquirer 
Accretive Targets) and accretive bidders (Lag Acquirer Accretive Bidders) are not significant. This 
is consistent with the results of Garvey et al (2013). We furthermore find that the firm-specific 
error for both targets (Lag Target Firm Specific Error) and acquirers (Lag Acquirer Firm Specific 
Error) are positive and significant. Thus, together with the targets number of accretive bidders, 
seems to be strong predictors of whether stock is used as the method of payment. Garvey et al 
(2013) find similar results regarding the firm-specific error of the acquirers, however as for the 
regression in column (3), the coefficient is not statistically significant for the targets. 
Lastly we examine the relationship between book based viable bidders and targets and the 
use of stock as a method of payment, shown in column (5). Similar to Garvey et al (2013) we 
observe that the coefficient for the number of viable targets (Lag Target Book Targets) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Further, we find that none of the mispricing measures from Rhodes-
Kropf et al (2005) are significant when applying the book-based measures for viable bidders (Lag 
Target Book Bidders, Lag Acquirer Book Bidders) and targets (Lag Target Book Targets, Lag 
Acquirer Book Targets). The acquirer controls show an interesting result. The coefficient the 
acquirers number of book bidders is both negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
when the number of the acquirer’s viable bidders is higher, the less likely the acquirer is to finance 
the deal with 100% stock. Garvey et al (2013) find the opposite result for the acquirer’s book 
targets, while our coefficient is both negative and not significant.  
Garvey et al (2013) find that a firm with average attributes across the board has a probability 
of the method of payment being stock of 31.2%. Furthermore, they conclude in their paper, based 
on column (3) of Table 6a, that an increase from the median to the maximum of the number of 
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viable targets for an acquirer will increase the probability of a deal being 100% stock financed by 
20%. Garvey et al (2013) do not state whether this is the acquirer’s book-, accretive- or RIM targets. 
Based on their model, a 20% increase in probability reflects a marginal coefficient of 0.1248, which 
is nowhere to be found in their table. The closest significant coefficient in the table is in regression 
(5) representing a 25% increase when an acquirer’s book bidders increase from the median to the 
maximum.  
These somewhat unidentifiable results lead us to some extent deviate in this calculation 
from what Garvey et al (2013) do in the original paper, as we apply the number of accretive bidders 
for a target to the model. This is both significant and positively related to a deal being stock financed 
with coefficients of 0.195.  For a firm with average attributes across the board, including the number 
of viable targets and bidders, the unconditional probability of stock being the method of payment 
is 31.9%14. If the number of viable accretive bidders for a target firm goes up from the median to 
the maximum level, the probability of deals using only stock as the method of payment increases 
by 31%15, which is a fairly substantial increase. The number of viable accretive targets for an 
acquirer however is not significant, hence unsuccessful in identifying stock based deals.  
In Table 6 Panel B, we report the results from our regressions predicting the method of 
payment at the industry level. In line with Garvey et al (2013) we run OLS regressions using the 
number of 100% stock-financed merger announcements in each industry, each year, as our 
dependent variable. As our key test variable, we use the lagged values of the average accretive 
bidders in each industry each year (Lag Ind Average Accretive Bidders) and control for year- and 
industry fixed effects in the regressions and with control variables. 
 Garvey et al (2013) report that their results displayed in Table 6b of their paper, are similar 
to those in Table 6a, namely that the number of a target’s accretive bidders have a strong positive 
effect in predicting the use of stock in merger deals. We obtain similar results from our data in 
regards to the relevance of accretive bidders. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) of Table 6 Panel 
                                                 
14 3,325 stock financed deals out of 10,423 total deals announced 
15 (
31.9%+(0.5∗0.195)
31.9%
) − 1 
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B, where we control for fixed effects in the regressions, support their conclusion from Table 6a and 
our in Table 6 Panel A. Namely, that the number of accretive bidders is both significant and positive 
in regards to whether a takeover is stock financed or not, with coefficients ranging from 0.107 to 
0.128.  
Our results partially contradict Garvey et al’s (2013) conclusion to hypothesis 2 (𝐻2) as the 
number of viable targets are deemed insignificant. However, a the number of viable bidders have 
a strong predictive power, and an increase of this variable results in a significantly higher 
probability of a stock financed deal taking place. Garvey et al (2013) conclude that a greater number 
of viable targets increase the probability of firms using stock as medium of consideration. This 
contradicts our results as we find the number of viable bidders as the only significant factor of the 
two. This partially confirms our second hypothesis (𝐻2) confirming that at least the number of 
viable bidders has predictive power. 
8.5 Predicting Horizontal Mergers 
In line with Garvey et al (2013), when calculating the numbers of viable bidders and targets, 
we restrict the count to companies within the same two-digit SIC industry. This causes us to believe 
that we may also do a better job at predicting horizontal mergers, i.e. within-industry mergers. We 
identify horizontal mergers in our sample of announced deals as mergers taking place between two 
firms within the same two-digit SIC industry and create a dummy variable horizontal, taking the 
value 1 when this constraint is satisfied. We denote the others as non-horizontal and give the 
horizontal dummy the value 0. Analogous to our previous analyses we run probit regressions, where 
the independent variables are CFD transformed, the standard errors are clustered at industry levels 
and we control for year- and industry fixed effects in some of the regression. The marginal effects 
are reported in Table 7. 
If the measures of numbers of bidders and targets are more related to within industry 
valuation dispersion, it should predict a higher likelihood of horizontal mergers. In columns (1) and 
(2) we only control for year fixed effects. In line with Garvey et al’s (2013) results, we observe that 
both measures of a target’s viable targets and bidders (accretive and book) are positively related to 
horizontal mergers and highly significant, with coefficients of 0.321 and 0.306 respectively. 
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However, when adding industry fixed effects in columns (3) and (4), only book bidders for the 
targets remain significant and the number of accretive targets for the target turns negative. Hence, 
especially when applying book measures, horizontal mergers seem likely to be driven by industry 
specific characteristics, such as technological change, deregulation and other related industry 
shocks.    
8.6 Sensitivity to the Acquisition Premium 
Our assumed acquisition premium of 20% is somewhat arbitrary, but roughly in line with 
what is observed in practice (Petitt & Ferris, 2013). Following Garvey et al (2013) we additionally 
run sensitivity analyses with a range of different premiums16. We apply premiums of 10%, 50%, 
100% and 200% in these sensitivity tests. We run the calculations for the number of viable accretive 
and book bidders for the mentioned premiums and repeat the regressions from columns (3) and (4) 
in Table 2. Table 8, Panel A and B portray the summary statistics, coefficients and p-values 
respectively.  
In line with Garvey et al (2013), the number of viable bidders as well as the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficients drop with increasing premiums (although they report that the 
coefficient for book bidders increases from 0.016 to 0.018 when moving from a 20% to a 50% 
premium). Initially, our results, like Garvey et al’s (2013), do not seem to be very sensitive to the 
premiums. The count of accretive bidders in both the acquirer and target samples are only reduced 
by about 50% with an increase of the premium from 10% to the unrealistic size of 100% as shown 
in Panel B (from 91.51 and 104.43 to 45.56 and 53.72 respectively).   
Further examination of the coefficients reveals no surprising deviations between our findings 
and the results of Garvey et al (2013). In line with the original paper the coefficients for both book 
and accretive bidders drop with increasing premiums. An interesting observation is that their 
coefficients remain statistically significant for all premiums. Our accretive bidders p-value reaches 
0.081 at a 100% premium, and is no longer statistically significant for predicting the likelihood of 
                                                 
16 We do not include negative premiums as they are rare and counterfactual, this would additionally result in the count of viable 
bidders approaching the number of firms in the industry, which we have included as controls in our regressions. 
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being a target. For book bidders however, our coefficient does not lose its significance until the 
premium is adjusted to 200% with a corresponding p-value of 0.760. 
For further insight into the sensitivity of the premium on target prediction, we additionally 
ran the regressions from Table 2 columns (1) through (5) with premiums of 10% and 50%, reporting 
our main control variables in Table 8 Panel C and D17. As we see from the tables, our results are 
robust to changes in premiums. When using a 10% premium in Panel D the coefficient of accretive 
bidders increase slightly across all panels and is significant at the 1% level. We see the same pattern 
for book bidders where the coefficient increases from 0.025 to 0.026 in column (3). In Panel C, 
applying a 50% premium, the coefficients for both accretive and book bidders drop and we observe 
a reduced significance. This is especially true for accretive bidders in column (3), where the 
significance drops from the 1% to the 5% level. The three misvaluation components from Rhodes-
Kropf et al (2005) remain almost unchanged, compared to the baseline results with a 20% premium, 
and thus seem to be robust to changes in premium. 
 We follow the same procedure for acquirer prediction by running the regressions displayed 
in Table 3 and report the results in Panels E and F. As we observed for the targets, the coefficient 
for our main variable of interest, accretive targets, increases slightly when applying a lower 
premium and decreases when applying a higher premium. As we observe in Table 3, the accretive 
targets coefficient is robust to the controls in columns (1) and (2) but not (3), (4) and (5). Again, 
we see that the firm-specific error and long-run value-to-book are highly significant and positive 
in column (5) and none of the three Rhodes-Kropf et al measures are sensitive to changes in the 
acquisition premiums to 10% and 50%.   
To sum up, we find that our results are robust to changes in the acquisition premium within 
a reasonable range. Ferris & Petitt (2013) find that empirically the premium averages between 20% 
and 30%. This supports the use of a 20% premium in our analyses. By testing for premiums of 10% 
and 50%, we were able to confirm the robustness of the model and results presented in this paper. 
                                                 
17 We do not report the remaining control variables used in the regressions, but note that they were not subject to any significant 
changes. 
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9. Conclusion 
This paper follows Garvey et al’s (2013) methods, investigating the possibility of ex ante 
predicting which firms ultimately become takeover targets. Specifically, they wanted to examine if 
the likelihood of being a target is related to the number of the firm’s viable bidders. Founded on 
existing theory, suggesting that acquirers purchase underpriced assets using their overvalued stock, 
Garvey et al (2013) develop two viability measures based on earnings and book values per share. 
As an additional hypothesis, in line with Garvey et al (2013), we investigate if these numbers of 
viable bidders and targets carry predictive power in regards to whether stock is used as the source 
of finance. 
Through our probit regressions, including controls for factors discussed in previous merger 
literature, we find clear evidence supporting Garvey et al’s (2013) conclusion to the first hypothesis 
(𝐻1). The likelihood of being a target, controlling for an exhaustive set of variables, is both 
positively and significantly related to the number of viable bidders available. This is a strong 
indication that market mispricing is an important driver for merger likelihood.  
Additionally, we are successful in identifying other relevant and significant variables for 
target prediction. Namely, the number of takeovers in the industry, Rhodes-Kropf et al’s (2005) 
firm-specific error and a negative relationship to a firm's price over forecasted earnings. Predicting 
acquirers however, seems to be more related to the misvaluation components then the sheer number 
of viable targets. Again, our results are very much in line with the original paper.  
Shifting our attention to the second hypothesis (𝐻2) we are only able to partially confirm 
the results presented in Garvey et al (2013). Our findings suggest that the target's number of 
accretive bidders seems to be the leading predictor in identifying whether or not a deal is financed 
by stock.  Additionally, we find a strong positive and significant relationship to both the target and 
acquirers firm-specific misvaluation component, thus increasing the likelihood of the deal being 
stock financed.    
Garvey et al (2013) claim that the number of firms in the industry is one of the main 
predictors for industry level merger intensity. Our results however contradict their findings and 
suggest this is insignificant. Further contradicting findings show that the probability of a takeover 
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being stock financed is not driven by a target's number of accretive targets, but the target’s number 
of accretive bidders and both the target’s and acquirer’s firm-specific misvaluation. Throughout 
our regressions, the merger wave variable is consistently positive and significant, and carries a 
considerably higher predictive power than reported in Garvey et al’s (2013) paper. 
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11. Appendix 
11.1 SDC Data Details 
Database Selection: 
Mergers & Acquisitions:     US Targets 
Calendar Dates:                   01/01/1981 – 12/31/2012 
Form of the Deal: 
(M) Merger: A combination of business takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or private 
company is acquired. 
(A) Acquisition: Deal in which 100% of a company is spun off or split off is classified as an 
acquisition by shareholders. 
(AM) Acquisition of Majority interest: The acquirer must have held less than 50% and be seeking 
to acquire 50% or more, but less than 100% of the target company’s stock. 
(AA) Acquisition of Assets: Deals in which the assets of a company, subsidiary, division, or branch 
are acquired. This code is used in all transactions when a company is being acquired and the 
consideration sought is not given. 
Deal Type: 
(1) Disclosed Value: indicates all deals that have a disclosed dollar value and the acquirer is 
acquiring an interest of 50% or over in a target, raising its interest from below 50% to above 50%, 
or acquiring the remaining interest it does not already own. 
(2) Undisclosed Value: indicates all deals that do not have a disclosed dollar value and the acquirer 
is acquiring an interest of 50% or over in a target, raising its interest from below 50% to above 
50%, or acquiring the remaining interest it does not already own. 
(3) Leveraged Buyouts: indicates that the transaction is a leveraged buyout. An “LBO” occurs when 
an investor group, investor, or firm offers to acquire a company, taking on an extraordinary amount 
of debt, with plans to repay it with funds generated from the company or with revenue earned by 
selling off the newly acquired company's assets. TF considers a deal an LBO if the investor group 
includes management or the transaction is identified as such in the financial press and 100% of the 
company is acquired. 
(4) Tender Offers: indicates a tender offer is launched for the target. A tender offer is a formal offer 
of determined duration to acquire a public company's shares made to equity holders. The offer is 
often conditioned upon certain requirements such as a minimum number of shares being tendered. 
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Report Items: 
(DA)           Date Announced 
(ANL)     Acquirer Name 
(TNL)     Target Name 
(STAT)    Deal Status 
(ACU)     Acquirer 6-digit CUSIP 
(AIP)     Acquirer Immediate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
(AUP)     Acquirer Ultimate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
(TCU)    Target 6-digit CUSIP 
(TIP)     Target Immediate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
(TUP)     Target Ultimate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
(APUB)    Acquirer Public Status 
(TPUB)    Target Public Status 
(CONSID_STRUCTURE)  Consideration Structure 
(TEND)    Tender Offer Flag (Y/N) 
11.1.1 Comparison of dataset process stages with Garvet et al (2013) 
Step 1: After dropping no announcement date and duplicate records when all of the target's CUSIP, acquirer's CUSIP, 
date announced and status are the same. Step 2: After dropping deals where target's CUSIP or targets’ parent CUSIP 
equals to either acquirer's CUSIP or acquirers parent CUSIP and if the same target and acquirer pair was recorded more 
than once in the same year or was recorded the prior year. Step 3: After requiring both target’s and acquirer’s status to 
be public. Step 4: After requiring all targets to have eight digit CUSIP and dropping the record if the same target was 
reported more than once in the same year and was reported the previous year 
 
 
Original Paper Our sample
SDC data - 214,296         - -
Step 1 212,618         214,147         1,529 0.72 %
Step 2 199,496         208,307         8,811 4.42 %
Step 3 10,701           10,423           -278 -2.60 %
Step 4 7,367             7,766             399 5.42 %
Actual target records 3,427             3,150             -277 -8.08 %
Fictional target records 3,408             3,335             -73 -2.14 %
Target sample 6,835             6,485             -350 -5.12 %
Acquirer sample 7,404             7,418             14 0.19 %
Deviation
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11.2 CRSP Compustat Merged Dataset Details 
We downloaded the CRSP Compustat merged annual fundamentals database from WRDS using 
the following filters: (Note that we choose wide filters in our search query in order to get as many 
records as possible). 
Data Date:      1980-01 - 2013-12 
Company codes format:    CUSIP 
Screening variables:     C, INDL, SDT, D, USD, CAD, Active, Inactive 
Linking options:     LC, LU, LS, LX, LD, LN, NR, NU 
Fiscal period and link date requirements:  Any part of fiscal period is within link date range 
Link information:     Historical CRSP Permco/Permno link to Compustat  
Identifying information:    Com. name, CUSIP, Fiscal Year-End, Ticker Symbol 
Company data for further analysis: 
(AT)     Book value of assets 
(BKVLPS)    Book value per share 
(DLC)     Debt in Current Liabilities – Total 
(DLTT)    Long-Term Debt - Total       
(PRCC_F)    Price Close – Annual – Fiscal 
(MKVALT)   Market Value – Total – Fiscal 
(SEQ)     Stockholders’ Equity – Total 
(CSHO)    Common Shares Outstanding         
(SIC)     Standard Industry Classification Code 
(NI)     Net Income 
11.3 I/B/E/S Summary Details 
IBES Statistical Period End: 1980-01 - 2013-12 
Company Identifier:   CUSIP (8-digit)  
Measures:    (EPS) Earnings Per Share 
Fiscal Period Indicator:  (1) Fiscal Year 1 
Other Variables:   Forecast Period End Date, IBES Statistical Period, Mean Estimate 
54 
11.4 Empirical Variable Definition 
The variables used in the analysis are defined as follows: 
 Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
 Size Square is the squared value of the CDF transformed Size variable. 
 Leverage is the ratio of the sum of long-term and short-term debt to total assets. 
 P/FE is the ratio of stock price to the one-year forecasted earnings per share. 
 Ind Num Takeover is the number of takeovers for each two digit SIC industry. 
 Ind Num Firms is the total number of firms in each two digit SIC industry. 
 Tender Offer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal form is tender offer, 0 otherwise. 
 Stock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal was financed with stock offer, 0 
otherwise. 
 Firm-Specific Error is the deviations of valuation implied by sector valuation multiples 
calculated in the year due to firm-specific pricing error. Please see Rhodes-Kropf et al 
(2005) for more details. 
 Time-Series Error is the industry’s deviations of valuation implied by its long-run 
multiples calculated in the year. Please see Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) for more details. 
 Long-run V to B is the difference between valuations implied by long-run multiples and 
current book values. Please see Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) for more details.  
 Ind P/FE SD is the standard deviation of the industry’s P/FE ratio each year. 
 Ind P/FE Interdecile is the difference between the industry’s 90th percentile P/FE ratio and 
the industry’s 10th percentile P/FE ratio each year.  
 Ind P/B Interdecile is the difference between the industry’s 90th percentile P/FE ratio and 
the industry’s 10th percentile P/FE ratio each year.  
 Accretive Bidders is the number of EPS based viable bidders for a firm 
 Accretive Targets is the number of EPS based viable targets for a firm. 
 Book Bidders is the number of book value based viable bidders for a firm. 
 Book Targets is the number of book value based viable targets for a firm. 
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11.5 Tables and Figures 
11.5.1 Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlation tables 
Panel A: Median Accretive Bidders and Number of Takeovers 
This panel reports the results of OLS regressions of the number of takeovers on the median number of accretive bidders, 
S&P 500 index and the price to book dispersion (Interdecile). We use either the current or last year's value. The median 
number of accretive bidders is calculated as the median number of accretive bidders across all firms in the year. We 
report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Panel B-1 contains 
summary statistics of our key variables, separated into three categories in the subsequent year: acquirers, targets and 
non-mergers. Lag accretive bidders is defined as the lagged value of the number of forecasted earnings per share (mean 
analysts' estimated earnings) based viable bidders for a firm and lag book bidders is the number of book value based 
viable bidders for a firm. Analogous definitions are given for lag accretive targets and lag book targets. See Appendix 
11.4 for all other variable definitions. Panel C-1 summarizes our control variables according to the same subcategories. 
Panel D and E contain relevant correlations.  Panel B-2 and C-2 represent Garvey et al’s (2013) findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2)  (3)
Median Num Accretive Bidders Current Year 13.226***
(2.000)
Median Num Accretive Bidders Last Year 17.192*** 17.841***
(2.470) (2.220)
S&P 500 Index -0.101** -0.184***
(0.030) (0.030)
Market to Book Dispersion (Interdecile) 42.463** 52.352***
(14.460) (13.400)
S&P 500 Index Last Year -0.192***
(0.030)
Market to Book Dispersion (Interdecile) Last Year 40.126**
(13.510)
Observations 32 31 31
R
2
0.777 0.789 0.786
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Panel B-1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
 
 
 
Panel B-2: Summary Statistics for Key Variables in Garvey et al (2013) 
 
 
 
Panel C-1: Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
 
 
 
Panel C-2: Summary Statistics for Control Variables in Garvey et al (2013)  
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Lag Accretive Bidders 4,406 82.79 51 3,129 95.53 61 78,019 62.40 32
Lag Book Bidders 5,390 97.84 54 4,947 135.72 81 130,547 102.54 53
Lag Accretive Targets 4,406 103.10 61 3,129 67.99 34 78,019 67.34 33
Lag Book Targets 5,390 166.63 103 4,947 119.08 63 130,547 100.76 50
Acquirer Sample Non-Merger SampleTarget Sample
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Lag Accretive Bidders 5,654 108.28 68 5,351 129.55 83 127,188 92.31 50
Lag Book Bidders 5,585 104.97 62 5,244 138.92 80 124,257 105.40 55
Lag Accretive Targets 5,654 141.64 87 5,351 105.26 58 127,188 93.78 48
Lag Book Targets 5,585 167.70 100 5,244 125.41 66 124,257 104.69 51
Acquirer Sample Target Sample Non-Merger Sample
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Lag Size 5,564 7.16 7.26 5,316 5.41 5.28 138,526 5.33 5.22
Lag Leverage 5,505 0.21 0.18 5,273 0.21 0.16 137,618 0.24 0.18
Lag P/FE 4,924 35.71 19.19 4,160 19.79 13.54 95,803 30.47 16.28
Lag Ind Num Takeover 6,972 20.43 12.00 6,251 19.08 10.00 181,906 11.36 6.00
Lag Firm Specific Errors 3,965 0.18 0.14 3,839 -0.03 -0.05 106,943 -0.01 -0.01
Lag Time Series Errors 3,974 0.08 0.09 3,841 0.04 0.07 107,133 0.03 0.06
Lag Long Run VtoB 3,974 0.66 0.65 3,841 0.73 0.70 107,133 0.68 0.65
Lag Ind Num Firms 6,272 383.29 348.00 6,251 362.34 320.00 181,906 382.65 273.00
Non-Merger SampleTarget SampleAcquirer Sample
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Lag Size 5,654 7.30 7.41 5,351 5.67 5.59 127,188 5.51 5.44
Lag Leverage 5,654 0.21 0.18 5,351 0.22 0.18 127,188 0.23 0.19
Lag P/FE 5,654 42.72 18.95 5,351 27.57 14.43 127,188 36.60 15.96
Lag Ind Num Takeover 5,654 19.87 11.00 5,351 19.07 10.00 127,188 11.76 5.00
Lag Firm Specific Errors 5,654 0.07 0.01 5,351 -0.01 -0.02 127,188 0.01 -0.03
Lag Time Series Errors 5,654 0.11 0.02 5,351 0.03 -0.01 127,188 0.03 -0.02
Lag Long Run VtoB 5,654 0.32 0.30 5,351 0.33 0.33 127,188 0.38 0.37
Lag Ind Num Firms 5,654 392.91 351.00 5,351 369.30 369.30 127,188 293.65 224.00
Non-Merger SampleAcquirer Sample Target Sample
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Panel D: Correlations Among Key Variables and Controls 
 
 
 
 
Accretive Accretive Book Book P/FE P/B Ind Num Ind Num Firm Specific Time Series Long Run
Bidders Targets Bidders Targets Interdecile Interdecile Takeover Firms Error Error V to B
Accretive Bidders 1.0000
Accretive Targets -0.0055 1.0000
Book Bidder 0.6145 0.2954 1.0000
Book Targets 0.3438 0.6129 0.0254 1.0000
P/FE Interdecile -0.0676 -0.0612 -0.0499 -0.0826 1.0000
P/B Interdecile 0.1345 0.1259 0.1540 0.1328 0.0504 1.0000
Size 0.0032 0.0294 -0.0694 0.0217 -0.2632 0.0155 1.0000
Leverage -0.1166 -0.2375 -0.1479 -0.2040 0.0374 -0.0041 0.2108 1.0000
P/FE -0.1323 0.1810 -0.0356 0.0883 0.0608 0.0070 -0.0336 -0.0525 1.0000
Ind Num Takeover 0.6066 0.5787 0.5779 0.6053 -0.0249 0.2801 0.0229 -0.1966 0.0144 1.0000
Ind Num Firms 0.5618 0.5411 0.5519 0.5775 -0.1338 0.1329 0.0516 -0.1023 0.0218 0.6770 1.0000
Firm Specific Error -0.1852 0.1816 -0.3756 0.3912 -0.0433 -0.0035 0.0678 -0.0117 0.1454 -0.0173 0.0290 1.0000
Time Speries Error 0.0563 0.0872 0.0429 0.1044 -0.2758 0.3899 0.0859 -0.0120 0.0032 0.1509 0.0859 -0.0277 1.0000
Long run V to B 0.0638 0.0115 -0.0604 0.2237 0.0721 -0.0046 -0.3411 -0.1298 0.0302 0.0366 -0.0229 -0.0267 -0.0722 1.0000
* All measures except P/FE interdecile and P/B interdecile are reported as lagged values
P/FESize Leverage
58 
Panel E: Correlations Between Industry Merger Rates and the Number of Viable Bidders 
 
 
Correlations Between Merger Rate and Median Viable Bidders by Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations Between Merger Rate and Median Viable Bidders by Industry Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spearman Pearson
Merger Rate Merger Rate
Median Accretive Bidders 0.94 0.96
Median Book Bidders 0.96 0.93
Spearman Pearson
Merger Rate Merger Rate
Median Accretive Bidders 0.71 0.83
Median Book Bidders 0.73 0.80
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11.5.2 Table 2: Likelihood of Being a Target and the Number of Viable Bidders 
The dependent variable is a takeover dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a takeover target and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by the empirical cumulative 
distribution function (CDF). We run probit regressions where our primary variables of interest are our measures of the 
number of viable bidders available for each candidate target firm and report the marginal effects in the table. We 
control for year- and industry fixed effects in all regressions, and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We 
report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
  
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Bidders 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lag Book Bidders 0.025*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.004)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.005 0.008*** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.002 0.010*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Ind P/FE SD -0.013***
(0.004)
Ind P/FE Interdecile -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ind P/B Interdecile -0.002
(0.005)
Lag Ind Num Takeover 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Lag Size 0.079*** 0.079*** -0.086*** 0.085*** 0.081***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Lag Size Square -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.085***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lag Leverage -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lag P/FE -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Lag Ind Num Firms 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016)
Observations 83,561 83,598 82,530 98,668 81,928
Pseudo R
2
0.059 0.059 0.061 0.050 0.060
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11.5.3 Table 3: Likelihood of Being an Acquirer and the Number of Accretive Targets 
The dependent variable is a takeover dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a takeover bidder and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by the empirical cumulative 
distribution function (CDF). We run probit regressions where our primary variables of interest are our measures for 
the number of viable targets available for each candidate acquirer firm and report the marginal effects in the table. We 
control for year- and industry fixed effects in all regressions, and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We 
report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
 
 
 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Targets 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.035***
(0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.005
(0.005)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.020***
(0.005)
Ind P/FE Interdecile -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Ind P/FE SD -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.004)
Lag Ind Num Takeover 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Lag Size 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.025
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Lag Size Square 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.091***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
Lag Leverage -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lag P/FE -0.000 -0.001 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Lag Ind Num Firms 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 85,353 83,400 83,400 83,436 82,376
Pseudo R
2 0.047 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.112
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11.5.4 Table 4: Predicting Merger Intensity at the Firm Level 
The dependent variable is a merger dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a takeover target or a bidder. The independent 
variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by the empirical cumulative distribution 
function (CDF). Our primary variables of interest are our measures of the viable number of potential bidders and 
targets. We control for year- and industry fixed effects for all regressions, and cluster the standard errors at the industry 
level. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag Accretive Bidders 0.070*** 0.042*** 0.069*** 0.068***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Lag Accretive Targets 0.040*** 0.010 0.011 0.011
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.039*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Lag Time Speries Error 0.001 0.009 0.008
(0.004) (0.007) (0.010)
Lag Long Run V to B -0.019*** 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
Lag Ind Num Takeover 0.087*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.081***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Lag Industry TS Error*Bidders 0.001
(0.014)
Observations 85,515 85,515 143,691 82,530 82,530
Pseudo R
2 0.047 0.049 0.046 0.055 0.055
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11.5.5 Table 5: Predicting Merger Intensity at the Industry Level 
 
The dependent variable is the count of merger announcements in industry j, year i. The independent variables include the average number of bidders in industry j, 
the total number of firms in industry j, the log value of industry average price to book ratio, the industry average time-series error and the industry average of long-
run value-to-book ratio. All values are lagged. We also include the total number of mergers at year t-1 and the total number of mergers in industry j. We control for 
year fixed effects in all regressions except in column 4, 6, 8 and 10, in which we use total mergers at year t. We control for industry fixed effects except in column 
5, 6, 9 and 10, in which we instead use the total mergers in industry j. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag Ind Average Accretive Bidders 0.287*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.280*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.295*** 0.279*** 0.182*** 0.178***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lag Ind Num Firms -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag Ind Average P/B 0.723** 0.262 0.418* 0.365*
(0.300) (0.250) (0.240) (0.210)
Lag Ind Average Time Series Error 2.445*** 0.525 2.209*** 0.978**
(0.630) (0.400) (0.700) (0.430)
Lag Ind Average Long Run V to B 2.024*** 2.949*** 1.034*** 1.486***
(0.550) (0.500) (0.380) (0.360)
Tota Mergers Yeart-1 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Mergers Indj 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079 2,079
R
2 0.797 0.797 0.798 0.781 0.734 0.724 0.800 0.785 0.736 0.726
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11.5.6 Table 6: Predicting Method of Payment 
Panel A: Predicting Method of Payment at the Firm Level 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal only uses stock as method of payment and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by the empirical 
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The control variables include the standard deviation of the target's industry 
P/FE in column 1, the target's industry P/FE interdecile range in column 2, 3 and 4 and the target's industry P/B 
interdecile range in column 5. In addition, in all columns we control for the number of deals in target's industry, the 
target's size and size squared, the target's leverage, the target's P/FE, the number of firms in target's industry and a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the deal is tender offer and 0 otherwise. In column 4, we also include the acquirer's 
information including acquirer's size, leverage, P/FE, acquirer's industry P/FE interdecile and the acquirer's industry 
P/B interdecile. All controls except P/FE and P/B interdecile are lagged. To save space, we do not report the coefficients 
of these control variables. We run probit regressions and report the marginal effects in the table. We control for year- 
and industry fixed effects in all regressions and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We report standard 
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag Target Accretive Bidders 0.285** 0.271** 0.246** 0.195**
(0.112) (0.111) (0.102) (0.097)
Lag Target Accretive Targets 0.091 0.136 0.118 0.013
(0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.102)
Lag Target Book Bidders 0.001
(0.059)
Lag Target Book Targets 0.323***
(0.120)
Lag Acquirer Accretive Bidders 0.015
(0.110)
Lag Acquirer Accretive Targets 0.142
(0.095)
Lag Acquirer Book Bidders -0.126***
(0.096)
Lag Acquirer Book Targets -0.080
(0.108)
Lag Target Firm Specific Error 0.221*** 0.209*** -0.027
(0.058) (0.065) (0.092)
Lag Target Time Series Error 0.060 0.018 0.007
(0.046) (0.067) (0.037)
Lag Target Long Run V to B 0.042 0.054 -0.139
(0.049) (0.058) (0.109)
Lag Acquirer Firm Specific Error 0.205*** 0.112
(0.053) (0.071)
Lag Acquirer Time Series Error 0.105 0.040
(0.071) (0.044)
Lag Acquirer Long un V to B -0.001 0.044
(0.048) (0.045)
Observations 1,981 1,981 1,956 1,593 2,273
Pseudo R
2 0.309 0.312 0.323 0.346 0.293
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Panel B: Predicting Method of Payment at the Industry Level 
 
The dependent variable is the count of 100% stock-financed merger announcements in industry j, year t. The independent variables include the average number of 
bidders in industry j, the total number of firms in industry j, the log value of industry average price to book ratio, the industry average time-series error, the industry 
average of long-run value-to-book ratio. All values are lagged. We also include the total number of mergers at year t-1 and the total number of mergers in industry 
j. We control for year fixed effects in all regressions except in column 4, 6, 8 and 10, in which we use total mergers at year t. We control for industry fixed effects 
except in column 5, 6, 9 and 10, in which we instead use the total mergers in industry j. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag Ind Average Accretive Bidders 0.107*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.125*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 0.122*** 0.122*** -0.052*** -0.052***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Lag Ind Num Firms 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lag Ind Average M/B -0.780 -0.946 -0.814*** -0.825***
(1.890) (1.898) (0.248) (0.250)
Lag Ind Average Time Series Error 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.274 0.285
(0.000) (0.000) (2.610) (2.632)
Lag Ind Average Long Run V to B -5.693*** -5.700*** -1.542*** -1.552***
(0.873) (0.880) (0.360) (0.363)
Tota Mergers Yeart-1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Mergers Indj 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,142
Pseudo R
2 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.427 0.429 0.411 0.445 0.447 0.431 0.413
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11.5.7 Table 7: Likelihood of Horizontal Mergers and the Num Bidders and Targets 
The dependent variable is horizontal dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal happened between two firms within the 
same two digit SIC industry and 0 otherwise. The independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions 
are transformed by empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF). We run probit regressions where our primary 
measures are the number of viable bidders and targets available to each firm, and report the marginal effects in the 
table. We control for year fixed effect in all regressions and industry fixed effects in columns 3 and 4, and cluster the 
standard errors at the industry level. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 
10% significance levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Target Accretive Bidders 0.321** 0.006
(0.138) (0.103)
Lag Target Accretive Targets 0.186** -0.042
(0.080) (0.090)
Lag Target Book Bidders 0.306*** 0.168***
(0.116) (0.063)
Lag Target Book Targets 0.162* 0.930
(0.093) (0.061)
Observations 2,078 3,299 2,059 3,283
Pseudo R
2
0.053 0.041 0.216 0.211
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11.5.8 Table 8: Sensitivity to Changes in the Acquisition Premium 
In this table, we compute the number of accretive bidders and book bidders under alternative specifications of the deal 
premium. Panel A provides the summary statistics in the same manner as Panel B-1 in Table 1. Panel B reports the 
regression results of the variables accretive- and book bidders following the empirical model in column 3 and 4 in 
Table 2. Panel C and Panel D report the main control variables from regressions in Table 2 with premiums adjusted 
to 10% and 50% respectively.  Panel E and F report the main control variables from regressions in Table 3 with 
premiums adjusted to 10% and 50% respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Viable Bidders of Varying Premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sensitivity to Premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Premium of 10%
Lag Accretive Bidders 91.51 57 104.43 67 67.87 36
Lag Book Bidders 111.66 66 149.58 92 112.05 60
Premium of 20%
Lag Accretive Bidders 82.79 51 95.53 61 62.40 32
Lag Book Bidders 97.84 54 135.72 81 102.54 53
Premium of 50%
Lag Accretive Bidders 63.85 37.5 74.99 46 49.95 25
Lag Book Bidders 68.73 33 102.51 54 80.02 38
Premium of 100%
Lag Accretive Bidders 45.56 25 53.72 32 37.07 17
Lag Book Bidders 43.46 18 68.11 31 56.31 23
Premium of 200%
Lag Accretive Bidders 28.14 13 32.45 18 24.07 9
Lag Book Bidders 23.38 8 37.76 14 22.37 12
Target SampleAcquirer Sample Non-merger Sample
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Lag Accretive Bidders 0.032 0.001 0.030 0.003 0.025 0.030 0.020 0.081 0.017 0.115
Lag Book Bidders 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.760
Premium of 200%Premium of 100%Premium of 50%Premium of 20%Premium of 10%
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Panel C: Likelihood of Being a Target and the Number of Viable Bidders, 10% premium 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Likelihood of Being a Target and the Number of Viable Bidders, 50% premium 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Bidders 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Lag Book Bidders 0.026*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.004)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.005 0.008*** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.002 0.010*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 83,561 83,598 82,530 98,668 81,928
Pseudo R
2
0.059 0.059 0.061 0.049 0.060
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Bidders 0.023** 0.026** 0.025** 0.022*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Lag Book Bidders 0.020*** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.003)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.006 0.008*** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.002 0.009** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 83,561 83,598 82,530 98,668 81,928
Pseudo R
2
0.059 0.059 0.061 0.049 0.060
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Panel E: Likelihood of Being an Acquirer and the Number of Accretive Targets, 10% Premium 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: Likelihood of Being an Acquirer and the Number of Accretive Targets, 50% Premium 
 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Targets 0.032*** 0.016*** 0.017 0.018 0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.035***
(0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.005
(0.005)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.020***
(0.005)
Observations 85,353 83,400 83,400 83,436 82,376
Pseudo R
2 0.048 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.112
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Lag Accretive Targets 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Lag Firm Specific Error 0.035***
(0.004)
Lag Time Series Error 0.004
(0.005)
Lag Long Run V to B 0.020***
(0.005)
Observations 85,353 83,400 83,400 83,436 82,376
Pseudo R
2 0.047 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.112
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11.5.9 Figure 1: Summary of Empirical Distribution of Realized Acquisition Outcomes 
Each trio of bares represent the three different firm samples, the first bar represents the bidders-, the second represents the target-, and the last bar represents the 
non-merger sample. The bars represent Z-scores and are calculated by computing the average and the standard deviation of the median values in each subsample in 
Panel A of Table 1. We then subtract the average from the median and divide it by the standard deviation. 
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11.5.10 Figure 2: Key Variables Across Time 
The sample covers the period from 1982 to 2012. The “Tot Num Deals” is the total number of deals announced. The “S&P Index” is the S&P 500 at the end of the 
calendar year. The “P/B Interdecile” is the median level of interdecile dispersion of the price-to-book ratio. The “Median Accretive Bidders” is the median of lag 
values of the number of accretive bidders each year. The graph is scaled to relative sizes of corresponding series and the data table is provided blow the graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
Calendar Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Tot Num Deals 89 95 145 161 157 179 178 162 120 107 109 275 320 305 407 442 481 446 348 201 166 184 164 194 203 171 141 160 118 112 54
Median Accretive Bidders 18 20 24 25 25 27 27 30 29 28 31 32 37 37 43 46 44 43 40 36 36 35 36 37 39 37 37 33 36 36 36
S&P Index 141 165 167 211 242 247 278 353 330 417 436 466 459 616 741 970 1229 1469 1320 1148 880 1112 1212 1248 1418 1468 903 1115 1258 1258 1426
P/B Interdecile 3.40 4.84 3.84 4.36 4.85 4.68 4.00 4.68 4.19 5.36 5.18 5.16 4.31 5.29 5.54 5.58 5.83 8.44 6.58 5.03 3.97 5.06 5.08 4.92 5.18 5.71 3.72 4.35 4.88 4.67 4.88
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11.5.11 Figure 3: Actual Takeovers among Depository Institutions 
The sample covers the period from 1982 to 2012. The “Tot Ind Num Deals” is the total number of deals announced in the Depository Institutions industry (SIC 
code 60) in each year. The “Tot Ind Num Firms” is the total number of firms in the Depository Institutions industry each year. The “Median Accretive Bidders” is 
the median of lag values of the number of accretive bidders each year. The “Median Book Bidders” is the median of the lag values of the number of book bidders 
each year.  
 
72 
11.5.12 Figure 4: Actual Takeovers among Business Services Firms 
The sample covers the period from 1982 to 2012. The “Tot Ind Num Deals” is the total number of deals announced in the Business Services industry (SIC code 73) 
in each year. The “Tot Ind Num Firms” is the total number of firms in the Business Services industry each year. The “Median Accretive Bidders” is the median of 
lag values of the number of accretive bidders each year. The “Median Book Bidders” is the median of the lag values of the number of book bidders each year.  
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11.5.13 Figure 5: Actual Takeovers, Electronic & other E. Equipment and Components18 
The sample covers the period from 1982 to 2012. The “Tot Ind Num Deals” is the total number of deals announced in the Electronic and other Electrical Equipment 
and Components, except Computer Equipment industry (SIC code 36) in each year. The “Tot Ind Num Firms” is the total number of firms in the industry each year. 
The “Median Accretive Bidders” is the median of lag values of the number of accretive bidders each year. The “Median Book Bidders” is the median of the lag 
values of the number of book bidders each year.  
 
                                                 
18 Except Computer Ecquipment firms 
74 
11.5.14 Figure 6: Tot Ind Num firms and Tot Ind Num Deals from Figure 5, scaled 
The sample covers the period from 1982 to 2012. The “Tot Ind Num Deals” is the total number of deals announced in the Electronic and other Electrical Equipment 
and Components, except Computer Equipment industry (SIC code 36) in each year. The “Tot Ind Num Firms” is the total number of firms in the industry each year. 
The data series have been scaled according to max values for visual comparability.  
 
 
 
 
 
